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We investigate how Internal Labor Markets (ILMs) allow organizations to accommodate
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1 Introduction
We investigate the role of Internal Labor Markets (ILMs) in allowing complex organizations to
accommodate idiosyncratic shocks calling for labor adjustments in their units. To the extent that
hiring and firing costs plague the external labor market, labor adjustments may be less onerous
to perform within the internal labor market. Units hit by an adverse shock can avoid termination
costs by redeploying part of their employees to healthier units; similarly, units faced with profitable
growth opportunities can swiftly draw on the human capital available within the ILM, curbing
search and training costs. Hence, through the ILM, different units in large firms, business groups
and conglomerates can provide each other with mutual insurance. This unveils a new role for the
ILM, as a source of resilience for firms, in contrast to the earlier focus on ILMs as career mechanisms
enabling vertical mobility within firms.
To address the above issues, one needs to observe the structure of the business organization,
i.e. its constituting units. One also needs to measure workers’ mobility between these units as
well as the economic situation of the origin and destination units. In this paper, we obtain such
measures from a unique data set provided by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des
E´tudes E´conomiques), merging detailed information on the structure of business groups in France
(i.e. the different firms that comprise each group) with a matched employer-employee data set,
allowing us to follow individual job-to-job transitions between firms, together with administrative
fiscal data on balance sheets and income statements for virtually all French firms (including those
that belong to a group). Hence, we focus here on ILMs within business groups, i.e. groups of
independent legal entities controlled by a common owner. The same analysis cannot be performed
on multi-establishment firms (i.e. groups of establishments) since no data on profits, productivity,
debt, and other balance sheet items exist at the establishment level.
Our empirical analysis develops in two parts. We first provide measures of the “average” intensity
of ILM activity. These measures reflect multiple factors that can trigger ILM activity, including job
rotation programs, internal career paths, as well as shocks hitting some firms in the group. Average
measures constitute a benchmark against which we investigate, in the second part of the paper,
the effect of adverse and positive shocks, used to identify some of the causal mechanisms governing
ILMs, and the role of labor market frictions in driving the ILM response.
More in detail, in the first part of the paper we estimate that, for the average group-affiliated firm,
the probability to absorb a worker previously employed in the same group exceeds by 9 percentage
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points the probability to absorb a worker not previously employed in its group, controlling for the
time-varying “natural propensity” of each firm to hire workers with given characteristics. We also
find that ILM activity is most intense for high-skill workers. Group-affiliated firms in France are
thus prone to draw upon their group labor force rather than upon the external labor market: why is
this the case? Our evidence suggests that internal careers explain only in part why groups operate
ILMs. Indeed, ILM activity measured without counting promotions or demotions, hence by focusing
on horizontal job changes, remains very high. Furthermore, ILM activity is larger in groups that
are more diversified. These two findings go hand in hand in pointing to the idea that ILMs are used
to accommodate idiosyncratic shocks.
To further understand the co-insurance component of horizontal ILMs, in the second part of
the paper we explore the ILM’s reaction to idiosyncratic shocks. To study how ILMs allow groups
to respond to negative shocks, we rely on firm closures and mass layoffs. For each group-affiliated
closing firm, we identify the set of all the actual and potential destinations of the displaced workers.
We then look at the evolution of bilateral employment flows at closure relative to normal times (i.e.
four years before closure) for destination firms affiliated with the same business group as opposed
to destination firms that do not belong to the same group. We identify the causal effect of the
closure event on the ILM activity by exploiting the time variation of bilateral flows within each
firm-of-origin/firm-of-destination pair.
Closures and mass-layoffs within a group are shown to trigger ILM activity: at closure with
respect to normal times, the fraction of workers redeployed to a group-affiliated destination firm
is larger than the fraction redeployed to an external labor market destination firm by more than
11 percentage points, a threefold increase with respect to the baseline. The main beneficiaries of
the ILM activity are blue-collar workers, reversing the pattern observed in “average times”. Which
labor market frictions trigger this effect? We show that the closure (or downsizing) of group units
with just more than 50 employees - which according to French labor laws are subject to more
stringent labor market regulation - generates a larger increase in ILM flows than the closure of
units with just less than 50 employees. Hence, higher firing costs and greater union power make
ILMs more valuable for groups, particularly when faced with potentially large scale separations.
Workers also benefit from ILM reallocations: the employees of a closing group subsidiary move to
unemployment much less often than the employees of a closing stand-alone firm – particularly so
blue collar workers – albeit at the cost of a lower annual wage. This shows that ILMs, as a side-
product, provide workers with implicit employment insurance through greater job stability within
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the group. Additionally, we find that employees displaced from closing subsidiaries are redeployed,
within the ILM, to more efficient group units and to units that enjoy better growth opportunities.
Displaced workers are instead less actively reallocated to those units that lack the financial muscle
to expand their workforce. These results are consistent with the pattern observed in “average”
times showing that there is more scope for ILM activity in more diversified groups, whose firms are
more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks.
To further investigate these cross-insurance mechanisms, and to explore the role of hiring fric-
tions, we then study how groups use ILMs when faced with positive shocks, namely when a group
subsidiary experiences a growth opportunity following the death of a large competitor. We first
exploit one event that affected the French milk sector in 2004, the demise of the Parmalat multina-
tional due to the discovery of a major accounting fraud. Second, we identify and exploit all episodes
of large firm closures that can be confidently ascribed to firm-specific shocks, and thus represent
an opportunity for the remaining firms in the same sector. Our results show that group-affiliated
firms in the positively affected sector increase their use of the ILM – rather than the external labor
market – when hiring managers and other high-skill workers. Therefore, ILMs within groups help
alleviate the costs induced by an external search for skilled human capital (Kramarz and Michaud
(2010)).
By investigating the existence and the functions performed by internal labor markets in groups,
where human capital is actively reallocated across subsidiaries, this paper builds a bridge across the
labor/personnel economics literature and the finance literature. Starting with the work of Doeringer
and Priore (1971), the labor/personnel literature has mostly studied the functioning of vertical
mobility within firms. Focusing on promotion and wage dynamics, different authors have argued
that ILMs can provide effort incentives, wage insurance against fluctuations in workers’ ability,
and incentives to accumulate human capital.1 Our results suggest that these motives explain only
partially why organizations operate ILMs. By contrast, we present evidence that horizontal ILMs
are used to accommodate various economic shocks in the presence of frictions.
Within the finance literature, some have claimed that business groups, a widespread organiza-
tional form in both developed and developing economies, fill an institutional void when external labor
and financial markets display frictions (Khanna and Palepu (1997), Khanna and Yafeh (2007)).2
1See e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981), Harris and Holmstrom (1982), and the comprehensive surveys of Gibbons and
Waldman (1999), Lazear (1999), Lazear and Oyer (2012) and Waldman (2012). For more recent contributions to this
literature, see Friebel and Raith (2013) and Ke, Li, and Powell (2014).
2See La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) for ample evidence that
business groups account for a large fraction of the economic activity in many of the countries where they are active.
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While a large body of work has analyzed business groups’ internal capital markets, little atten-
tion has been devoted to understand whether they also operate ILMs and the precise operating
mechanisms.3 In a recent paper, Faccio and O’Brien (2015), using a large sample of publicly-
traded companies in 56 countries, show that employment in group-affiliated firms (as opposed to
stand-alone firms) is less affected by economic downturns, a finding which is consistent with the
hypothesis that groups operate ILMs. We support this hypothesis with direct evidence: by tracking
individual employees’ movements across group-affiliated firms, we find that French business groups
respond to idiosyncratic shocks by reallocating labor internally, thus bypassing firing and hiring
frictions and providing employment insurance to their workers.4 Focusing instead on diversified
multi-establishment firms, Tate and Yang (2015a) argue that the ILM induces workers to develop
skills that make them more “redeployable” across industries. This may explain their finding that
workers displaced after a plant closure are more likely to move to industries with better prospects
(whether through the internal or the external labor market) than workers displaced from single-plant
firms.5
Finally, our work contributes to a line of research looking at how firms provide insurance to
their employees. Related to our finding that internal labor markets allow business groups to provide
employment insurance to workers, family businesses in various countries (see Sraer and Thesmar
(2007) and Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi (2015)), as well as Chinese State groups (see Chen, Jiang,
Ljungqvist, Lu, and Zhou (2015)), seem to provide their employees with such insurance. We add to
this literature by investigating the extent to which ILMs allow organizations to protect employment
when faced with shocks. Another closely related line of research has asked whether firms provide
wage insurance to workers against both temporary and permanent shocks (Guiso, Pistaferri, and
Schivardi (2005)). The question of whether diversified groups are better able to provide wage
insurance to their workers lies beyond the scope of this paper, and is the next step in our research
agenda. However, we present some elements showing that, in groups hit by a negative shock,
displaced workers’ hourly wages tend to be insured while hours of work are not.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out a series of empirical predictions. In Section 3
3Several papers have studied internal capital markets in groups, showing that internal capital markets make group-
affiliated firms more resilient to shocks and to product market competition than stand-alone firms. See Gopalan,
Nanda, and Seru (2007), Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015), and Boutin, Cestone, Fumagalli, Pica, and Serrano-Velarde
(2013), as well as Maksimovic and Phillips (2013) for a recent survey.
4Our result that firing costs enhance the role of group ILMs is consistent with the evidence in Belenzon and
Tsolmon (2015) that business groups prevail in countries where employment protection regulations are stricter.
5In a related paper, Tate and Yang (2015b) provide evidence suggesting that firms engage in diversifying acquisitions
partly to reap the benefits of establishing an ILM. While these authors point to a bright side of ILMs, Silva (2013)
unveils a potential inefficiency of ILMs by documenting wage convergence within diversified conglomerates.
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we describe the data. Then, we present our empirical strategy and discuss our results for “average”
times in Sections 4, for bad times in 5, and for good times in 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
Internal labor markets may emerge within organizations as an optimal response to frictions that
make labor adjustments costly to perform on the external labor market. In this section we lay out the
mechanisms through which ILMs can create value, and put forward a series of testable predictions
with the aim of investigating how different labor market frictions determine ILM activity.
Consider first a firm hit by an adverse shock and willing to downsize its labor force: direct and
indirect costs of displacing workers may arise due to labor market regulation and union pressure.
For pure stand-alone firms, the main route to decreasing labor adjustment costs is through labor
hoarding, arguably a suboptimal choice following a permanent shock, and possibly not a financially
feasible option even in case of temporary shocks (see Sharpe (1994)). Group-affiliated firms have a
further option available: they can redeploy workers within the group’s internal labor market, achiev-
ing the desired labor force adjustments at substantially lower costs. Indeed, severance payments
and dismissal penalties can be avoided altogether when employees move within the ILM, even across
different subsidiaries of a corporate group. For instance, dismissals can be turned into costless vol-
untary separations by offering workers an alternative job within the same group.6 Also, in case of
collective terminations involving more complex employment protection procedures, union pressure
can be assuaged and labor law demands met more easily by redeploying (part of) the dismissed
workers within the group’s ILM. In light of this, we expect negative shocks that lead to layoffs
to trigger ILM activity. We also expect such ILM response to be more intense when employment
protection legislation is more stringent and separation costs are larger.
The ability to absorb employees from the internal labor market may also be valuable when firms
are willing to expand their labor force in response to positive shocks. Indeed, the ILM is likely to
suffer less from information asymmetry concerning workers’ characteristics (Greenwald (1986) and
Jaeger (2016)), and may perform better than the external labor market in matching a vacancy with
the specific skills required.7 Hence, we expect that in response to positive shocks that create growth
6Furthermore, in some employment protection systems, transfers among group-affiliated firms are penalty-free, to
the extent that workers need not be dismissed and re-hired when moving across firms affiliated with the same group
(see Belenzon and Tsolmon (2015))
7Previous work has documented that search and training costs are particularly important in the (external) market
for skilled human capital (see Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012)). This is
further supported by recent evidence that firms engage in acquisitions (Ouimet and Zarutskie (2013)) and vertical
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opportunities, group-affiliated firms will rely more intensely on the group’s ILM (as opposed to the
external labor market) to expand their labor force.
To summarize, internal labor markets may create value by allowing different units within the
same organization to provide each other with mutual insurance against shocks that, otherwise, would
call for costly external labor adjustments. As long as mobility costs within the ILM are not high,
firms’ owners benefit from the co-insurance the ILM provides against both negative and positive
shocks. We expect the co-insurance role of the ILM to be more pronounced in more diversified
groups, where different units are subject to imperfectly correlated shocks. Indeed, when group
units are subject to negatively correlated shocks, both the redeploying and the absorbing end of
an ILM transaction may benefit from the ILM ex-post, as long as workers move from the units
facing adverse shocks towards those with profitable expansion opportunities.8 Hence, we expect
efficient ILMs to reallocate human capital more intensely towards well-managed units operating
in high-growth sectors, but also to group units that have the financing capacity to seize growth
opportunities.9
To the extent that group-affiliated firms hit by adverse shocks adjust labor using ILMs, their
workers may receive employment insurance as a side product. This happens if reallocation through
the ILM reduces the exposure of group-affiliated workers to unemployment risk, as compared to
workers employed by stand-alone firms. The existing empirical literature has so far investigated
whether firms provide insurance to their workers, either by insulating their wages from shocks (see
Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005)) or by offering greater employment stability (see Sraer and
Thesmar (2007) and Ellul, Pagano, and Schivardi (2015)). We expect that, thanks to their ILM,
business groups are able to provide employment insurance to their employees against adverse shocks
hitting their individual subsidiaries.
3 The Data
Implementing the empirical strategies consistent with the background described in Section 2 requires
detailed information on both workers and firms. First, we need to observe workers’ labor market
integration (Atalay, Hortacsu, and Syverson (2014)) mainly to secure scarce human capital.
8In other words, the ILM allows growing and healthy units to “subsidize” poorly performing units by absorbing
their excess labor force, at the same time benefiting from access to human capital at lower information costs.
9A related albeit different question is whether the ILM redeploys employees more or less intensely towards sub-
sidiaries that are directly controlled by the parent as opposed to indirectly controlled subsidiaries in pyramidal groups
(we thank Bill O’Brien for raising this issue). Unfortunately, the LIFI only provides information on whether firms are
controlled by a common ultimate owner (whether directly or indirectly), and thus are part of the same group. Hence,
our data do not allow us to explore the relationship between the ILM and the precise hierarchical structure of each
group.
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transitions, i.e. workers’ yearly transitions from firm to firm. Second, for each firm, we need
to identify the entire structure of the group that this firm is affiliated with, so as to distinguish
transitions originating from (landing into) the firm’s group and transitions that do not originate
from (land into) the group. Third, we need information on firms’ characteristics. We obtain this
information for France putting together three data sources from the INSEE (Institut National de la
Statistique et des E´tudes E´conomiques).10
Our first data source is the DADS (De´clarations Annuelles des Donne´es Sociales), a large-scale
administrative database of matched employer-employee information. The data are based upon
mandatory employer reports of the earnings of each employee subject to French payroll taxes.
These taxes essentially apply to all employed persons in the economy (including self-employed).
Each observation in DADS corresponds to a unique individual-plant combination in a given year,
with detailed information about the plant-individual relationship. The data set includes the number
of days during the calendar year that individual worked in that plant, the (gross and net) wage,
the type of occupation (classified according to the socio-professional categories described in the
Appendix, Table A1), the full time/part time status of the employee. Moreover, the data set
provides the fiscal identifier of the firm that owns the plant, the geographical location of both the
employing plant and firm, as well as the industry classification of the activity undertaken by the
plant/firm. The DADS Postes, the version of the DADS we work with, is not a full-fledge panel of
workers: in each annual wave the individual identifiers are randomly re-assigned. Nevertheless, we
are able to identify workers year-to-year transitions as each wave includes not only information on
the individual-plant relationships observed in year t, but also in year t − 1. This structure allows
us to identify workers transiting from one firm to another across two consecutive years.11
The identification of business group structures is based on the yearly survey run by the INSEE
called LIFI (Enqueˆte sur les Liaisons Financie`res entre socie´te´s), our second data source. The
LIFI collects information on direct financial links between firms, but it also accounts for indirect
stakes and cross-ownerships. This is very important, as it allows the INSEE to precisely identify
the group structure even in the presence of pyramids. More precisely, LIFI defines a group as a set
of firms controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same entity (the head of the group). The survey
10France represents and interesting case study for investigating corporate groups. From 1999 to 2010, firms affiliated
with groups accounted for around 40% of total employment, with substantial variability observed across sectors: in the
financial sector affiliated firms account for more than 80% of total employment, whereas in agriculture the percentage
is below 10%. Within manufacturing, on average affiliated firms account for almost 70% of total employment, but
such share can be as high as 90% in automotive and energy.
11If an individual exhibits multiple firm relationships in a given year, we identify his/her main job by considering
the relationship with the longest duration and for equal durations we consider the relationship with the highest
qualification.
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relies on a formal definition of direct control, requiring that a firm holds at least 50% of the voting
rights in another firm’s general assembly. This is in principle a tight threshold, as in the presence
of dispersed minority shareholders control can be exercised with smaller equity stakes. However, we
do not expect this to be a major source of bias, as in France most firms are private and ownership
concentration is strong even among listed firms.12 To sum up, for each firm in the French economy,
the LIFI enables us to assess whether such firm is group-affiliated or not and, for affiliated firms, to
identify the head of the group and all the other firms affiliated with the same group.
The third data source we rely upon is the FICUS, which contains information on firms’ balance
sheets and income statements. It is constructed from administrative fiscal data, based on mandatory
reporting to tax authorities for all French tax schemes, and it covers the universe of French firms,
with about 2.2 million firms per year. The FICUS contains accounting information on each firm’s
assets, leverage and cash holdings, as well as capital expenditure, cash flows and interest payments.
The data span the period 2002-2010. We remove from our samples the occupations of the Public
Administration (33, 45 and 52 in Table A1) because the determinants of the labor market dynamics
in the public sector are likely to be different from those of the private sector. We also remove
temporary agencies and observations with missing wages. Finally, we also remove from the data
set those employers classified as “employeur particulier”: they are individuals employing workers
that provide services in support of the family, such as cleaners, nannies and caregivers for elderly
people.13 These restrictions leave us with, on average, 1,574,000 job-to-job transitions per year
during the sample period.
4 Internal Labor Markets at Work
4.1 Measuring average ILM activity: Are group firms more likely to hire on the
ILM rather than on the external labor market?
In this section we provide preliminary evidence that French groups operate internal labor markets.
We do so by asking whether group affiliated firms disproportionately rely on their group’s ILM in
order to adjust their labor force.
Because group structure may be endogenous, for instance in terms of occupations, and may
affect within-group mobility patterns, we face an identification challenge when assessing whether
12Bloch and Kremp (1999) document that in large private companies the main shareholder’s stake is 88%. Ownership
concentration is slightly lower for listed companies, but still above 50% in most cases.
13We remove also those employers classified as ‘fictitious’ because the code identifying either the firm or the plant
communicated by the employer to the French authority is incorrect.
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ILMs facilitate within-group job-to-job mobility. In fact, documenting that a large proportion of the
workers hired by an affiliated firm were previously employed in the same group is not per se evidence
that ILMs function more smoothly than external labor markets: intra-group mobility may be high
simply because groups are composed of firms that are intensive in occupations among which mobility
is naturally high, perhaps for technological reasons. In order to identify the contribution of the ILM
channel to the probability that a worker is hired by a firm affiliated with the same group as the firm
of origin, we need to control for the firm-specific – possibly time-varying – “natural” propensity
to absorb workers transiting between any two given occupations.14 We do this by applying the
following methodology.
Denote as c the set of workers in occupation o in any firm at t − 1 who move to occupation z
in any firm at time t. We model as follows the probability that worker i, moving from occupation
o to occupation z, finds a job in the group-affiliated firm j at time t:
Ei,c,k,j,t = βc,j,t + γc,j,tBGi,k,j,t + εi,k,j,t (1)
where Ei,c,k,j,t takes value one if worker i, moving from occupation o in any firm of origin (indexed
by k) to occupation z, finds a job in firm j at time t and zero otherwise. BGi,k,j,t takes value one if
worker i’s firm of origin k belongs to the same group as destination firm j, and zero otherwise. The
term βc,j,t is a firm-occupation pair specific effect that captures the time-varying natural propensity
of firm j to absorb workers transiting from occupation o to occupation z: it accounts for the fact
that occupation o may allow a worker to develop skills that are particularly suitable to perform
occupation z in firm j at time t.
Our parameter of interest γc,j,t measures the excess probability for a worker, moving from
occupation o to occupation z, to find a job in firm j if the firm of origin k is affiliated with
the same group as j, as compared to a similar worker originating from some firm k outside the
group. The error term εi,k,j,t captures all other factors that affect the probability that worker
i moving from occupation o in firm k to occupation z finds a job in firm j. We assume that
E(εi,k,j,t|BGi,k,j,t, c × j × t) = 0: conditional on observables, namely group affiliation and the
occupation-of-origin×occupation-of-destination×destination-firm time-varying effect, the error has
zero mean.
Direct estimation of equation (1) would require a data set with one observation for each job
14In other words, we need to properly build the counterfactual probability to hire workers, making a job-to-job
transition between two given occupations, if they originally worked in a non-affiliated firm.
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mover and potential firm of destination for each year. As our data set contains about 1,574,000
job-to-job transitions and approximately 40,000 group-affiliated firms per year, direct estimation of
the model would require the construction of a data set with as many as 62 billion observations per
year. In order to estimate the parameters of equation (1) while keeping the dimensionality of the
problem reasonable, we implement the methodology described in Appendix A.2, following Kramarz
and Thesmar (2013) and Kramarz and Nordstro¨m Skans (2014).15
The excess probability γc,j,t is a measure of ILM activity for each triplet (occupation pair ×
destination firm) and for each year. Our data set allows us to estimate approximately one million
ILM measures at the triplet level per year. We aggregate these measures at the firm level, taking
both simple and weighted averages of the estimated γ̂c,j,t across the various occupation pairs.
16 This
allows us to estimate, for each group-affiliated firm in our sample, time-varying but firm-specific
average excess probabilities γ̂j,t. Table 1 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics of these firm-level
average measures of ILM activity. For the average firm, the probability to absorb a worker already
employed in the same group exceeds by about 9 percentage points the probability to absorb a worker
on the external labor market between 2003 and 2010. The weighted averages are very similar to the
unweighted results (bottom part of the panel).17
Group-affiliated firms are thus particularly prone to draw from their group labor force rather
than from the external labor market: why is this the case? As pointed out by the personnel
economics literature, organizations may rely on their vertical ILM to shape employees’ careers.
However, we conjecture that groups may as well operate an horizontal ILM as a way to adjust their
labor force in response to idiosyncratic shocks hitting some of their units. In Panel B of Table 1,
we focus on the subset of excess probabilities computed for job-to-job transitions between identical
occupations of origin and destination. This should rule out many job transitions up or down the
career ladder, to the extent that a promotion (or a demotion) often results in a move across different
occupational categories (e.g. an unskilled blue-collar promoted to skilled blue-collar). The results in
Panel B show that even when focusing on same occupation transitions, average excess probabilities
15Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) assess whether the probability of being hired in a given firm is larger when the
individual and the firm’s CEO belong to the same network, while Kramarz and Nordstro¨m Skans (2014) find that
graduates from a given class whose fathers are employed in a firm are more likely to be hired by that firm.
16The weights reflect the importance of the transitions from occupation o to occupation z for the group firm j is
affiliated with. In other words, the weight is the ratio of the number of transitions from occupation o to occupation
z that originate from firm j’s group to the total number of transitions (for all the occupation pairs associated with
firm j) that originate from firm j’s group.
17Table B3 in Appendix B.2 complements Table 1 by building an alternative measure of ILM intensity based on
worker outflows: on average, the probability that a worker originates from an affiliated firm if she finds a new job
within the same group exceeds by about 9 percentage points the probability that the worker originates from that firm
if she finds a new job outside the group.
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remain high: for a group-affiliated firm, the probability to absorb a worker already employed in the
same group exceeds by 7 percentage points the probability to absorb a worker on the external labor
market. This suggests that the design of employees’ careers explains only partly why French groups
operate internal labor markets.
4.2 ILMs and group diversification
The figures shown in Table 1 display an enormous amount of heterogeneity. The estimated ILM
parameter γ̂j,t is positive only for firms belonging to the top quartile of the distribution and is
negative for firms in the bottom decile: clearly, not all group-affiliated firms rely on the internal labor
market. Which firm and group characteristics help explain this pattern? Indeed, the population of
French groups is also highly heterogeneous along many dimensions: there exist relatively few, very
large groups, with many large affiliates that are diversified both from a sectoral and geographical
perspective; and many small groups, with few small affiliates, that are hardly diversified.18
In Section 2 we argued that the co-insurance role of the ILM should be more pronounced in
more diversified groups. Hence, in Table 2 we investigate whether our estimated measures of ILM
activity are larger for firms affiliated with more diversified groups.
We build a time-varying measure of group sectoral diversification by taking the opposite of an
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on the employment shares of the group in the different macro/4-
digit industries.19 Columns 1 and 2 show that diversification across macro sectors (agriculture,
service, finance, manufacturing, automotive and energy) is associated with more intense ILM activity
only for large groups, while this is not the case for average-sized groups. This result is in line with
the intuition that labor is less redeployable across very distant industries, which in turn may hinder
ILM activity; this effect is arguably less important in large groups where the internal labor market is
thicker and the array of skills available wider. Conversely, diversification across 4-digit sectors boosts
ILM activity irrespective of group size (column 3), the more so the larger the group (column 4).20
The effect of diversification is sizable: in a group of average size, a one-standard deviation increase in
(4-digit) diversification (see Appendix Table A2) boosts ILM activity by 0.0081 percentage points,
18 The distribution of group size in France, as measured by the total number of full time employees, is highly
asymmetric. Groups belonging to the top decile have on average 20 affiliates, employ 800 workers per unit, operate
in 7 different four-digit industries and in 4 different regions. Instead, groups in the rest of the population have on
average less than 5 units, employ less than 50 workers per-unit, operate in less than 3 different four-digit sectors and
mostly in the same region.
19This is obtained by first calculating the share of group employment accounted for by units active in each macro/4-
digit sector; then taking the (opposite of the) sum of the squared values of these shares.
20Table 2 shows a negative correlation between the number of affiliated firms and the excess probability, in the
presence of a group fixed effect. Indeed, in years when groups lose one or more units due to closures ILM activity
intensifies, hence larger excess probabilities are observed, a result we present in Table B1 in Appendix B.1.
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which represents a 8.9% increase in the average excess probability. In a group which is one-standard
deviation larger than the average, the increase in ILM activity equals 0.0246 percentage points,
which represents as much as 27% of the average excess probability.
Columns 5-8 focus instead on geographical diversification. We measure diversification between
the Paris and non-Paris areas, and across regions.21 As shown by columns 5 and 7, firms rely more
on the ILM when they are affiliated with a more geographically diversified group. This effect is
stronger in larger groups (columns 6 and 8).22 A priori, geographical dispersion allows group units
to be exposed to unrelated regional shocks, thus creating more scope for co-insurance to be provided
via the horizontal ILM. On the other hand, moving workers across more distant geographical areas
might be difficult, due to trade union resistance and employment protection regulation. Our results
suggest that the former effect prevails.
In Table 3, we also look at our disaggregated measure of ILM activity, the excess probability
γ̂c,j,t estimated at the triplet level (occupation pair × destination-firm). This allows us to augment
the specification estimated in Table 2 by adding indicators for the occupation of origin and occupa-
tion of destination, as well as a dummy Same Occupation, which takes value one if the occupation
of origin coincides with the occupation of destination. Interestingly, in column 6 of Table 3 we
document that diversification only boosts horizontal ILM activity, as captured by the Same Occu-
pation indicator interacted with Diversification. This is in line with the hypothesis that groups of
firms rely on the horizontal ILM as a mutual insurance mechanism, as opposed to the vertical ILM
which is instrumental to the design of employees’ careers. Indeed, Table 3 (Columns 1-3) shows
that “average” ILM intensity varies significantly across occupations. It is most intense for high-
skill occupations,23 suggesting that search costs and informational frictions play a role in explaining
groups’ use of ILMs. However, the same table (columns 5 and 7) suggests that diversification boosts
ILM mostly among blue-collar and clerks suggesting that diversified groups use ILMs to offer some
form of insurance to those workers likely to value it most. Section 5 will develop this point further.
The evidence presented in this section shows that ILMs do operate within French business
21Our measure of diversification is the (opposite of the) sum of the squared values of the share of total employment
of the group that is accounted for by units located within the Paris area and outside the Paris area, and in each of
the 22 regions in metropolitan France.
22Also in this case the magnitude of the effects is large: in a group of average size, a one-standard deviation increase
in diversification across regions boosts ILM activity by 0.01 percentage points, which represents a 11.8% increase in
the average excess probability. In a group which is one-standard deviation larger than the average, the increase in
ILM activity is 0.03 percentage points, i.e. as much as 33.3% of the average excess probability.
23Using the 2-digit occupational categories available in the DADS (see the Appendix, Table A1), we built four
broad categories that correspond to decreasing degrees of human capital and skill: Managers/High-Skill (managerial
and superior intellectual occupations), Intermediate (technicians and other intermediate administrative jobs), Clerical
Support, and Blue Collar occupations.
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groups. However, the excess probabilities we estimated measure an “average” ILM activity, that
can be triggered by different factors, including job rotation programs, internal career paths, as
well as shocks hitting some firms in a group. Indeed, the diversification results suggest that the
accommodation of shocks is a major factor in ILM activity between-firms within-group. In the
next two sections, by focusing on how shocks, negative and positive, affect between-firms within-
group employment flows, we go beyond the descriptive evidence examined so far and turn to causal
mechanisms.
5 The ILM Response to Adverse Shocks: Bad Times
As explained in Section 2, in the presence of external labor market frictions an ILM can become a
between-firm insurance mechanism within business groups, allowing firms hit by an adverse shock
to alleviate separation costs. To investigate how this mechanism operates, we exploit episodes of
firm closures and mass layoffs.
We first identify all episodes in which firms experience a drop in employment from one year to
the next of 90% or more during our sample period, 2002-2010. In order to eliminate false closures,
i.e. situations in which firms simply change identifier relabeling a continuing activity, we remove all
the cases in which more than 70% of the lost employment ends up in a single other firm. Appendix
Table A3 shows the number of closing firms, by firm size. Consistent with figures from INSEE
(Royer (2011)), we find that the incidence of closures among firms with more than 10 employees
is approximately 4%, whereas the incidence of closures among very small firms is twice as large.
The data also confirm that the effect on the real economy of the 2008 financial crisis materializes
in 2009, with an increase in the closure rate. Figure 1 provides information on the performance
of group-affiliated firms before they close or embark on a mass layoff: sales, as well as return on
assets and sales, deteriorate in the last two-three years before the closure/mass layoff. Interestingly,
closing/downsizing group subsidiaries see their coverage ratio fall below 1 in the last year, which
suggests that many closures in our sample are associated with financial default.24
For each eventually-closing firm, we identify the set of all actual and potential destination firms
of the displaced workers and compute the bilateral employment flows for each firm pair.25 Our unit
24These episodes may not be entirely exogenous as groups may choose which firms to close/downsize and when.
Yet, as long as groups do not selectively close affiliated firms with the aim of redeploying their workers to their other
units, as the above evidence seems to suggest, these events do generate exogenous variation useful when studying
ILMs.
25We consider as potential destination any firm that absorbs at least one employee, in at least one year, from firm i.
Destination firms affiliated with the same group as firm i are referred to as “ILM destination firms”, while the others
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of observation is thus a pair – firm of origin/destination firm – in a given year, in which the firm of
origin is a group-affiliated firm that eventually closes down (or dramatically reduces its labor force)
within our sample period. Using these observations, we study the evolution of bilateral employment
flows at closure relative to normal times (i.e. at least four years before closure) in pairs affiliated
with the same group as opposed to pairs not affiliated with the same group. Following a shock
that generates a large outflow of workers from the “closing” firm, the time dimension – i.e. the
comparison between the flows at closure time relative to flows in normal times – allows us to control
for all the time-invariant pair-specific determinants of the bilateral flow (in other words, we take
into account that two specific firms may experience intense flows of workers even in normal times).
The second difference, i.e. the comparison between pairs affiliated with the same group and pairs
not affiliated with the same group, identifies the impact of the closure on horizontal ILMs.26
Formally, we estimate the following model:
fijt = αt + φij + φ0BGjt + φ1SameBGijt + φ2dit + φ3cit ×BGjt + φ4cit × SameBGijt + εijt(2)
where fijt is the ratio of employees moving from an affiliated firm of origin i to a destination firm j
in year t to the total number of job-to-job movers that leave firm i in year t; the term αt represents
a set of year indicators; φij is a firm-pair fixed effect in our main specification; BGjt is an indicator
equal to 1 if the destination firm is affiliated with any group in year t; SameBGijt takes value 1 if
the destination firm is affiliated with the same group as firm i in year t. The term dit represents
a set of indicators capturing the distance to closure (measured in years) of firm i. The indicator
cit takes the value 1 in the last two years of firm i’s activity and is interacted with both BGjt and
SameBGijt. The variable of interest is the interaction between SameBGijt and cit. Its coefficient
φ4 captures the differential effect of closures on the bilateral employment flows (relative to normal
times) within firm pairs that belong to the same group relative to pairs that do not.
Since we measure employment flows at the firm of origin-destination firm level, we can control
for unobserved heterogeneity at the pair level. We are also able to explore the characteristics of the
firms that hire the displaced workers through the ILM, something we do in subsection 5.3.
Table 4 provides descriptive evidence on the flows of workers originating from firms that even-
tually close and shows that the average flow towards ILM destination-firms increases dramatically
as “External destination firms”, hereafter.
26Exploiting closure/large layoff events helps us capture the extent of the horizontal ILM activity, i.e. within-group
moves that are not instrumental to the design of employee careers, as opposed to the vertical (career-related) ILM
activity that plausibly takes place mostly in normal times.
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in the year before closure and at closure. Table 5 presents results based on the estimation of equa-
tion (2) confirming the descriptive evidence: at closure (relative to normal times), the fraction of
displaced workers redeployed to an internal labor market destination-firm is almost 12 percentage
points larger than the fraction redeployed to a non-affiliated firm (column 2). Given that at closure
the average flow to an external labor market destination-firm is 0.039 (Table 4), our estimates imply
that the increase in flows to ILM destination-firms is three times as large as the average external
flow. In column 1 we also present results obtained from an alternative specification which includes
only firm-of-origin fixed effect.
Results in columns 3 and 4 show that the closure shock has heterogeneous effects across different
occupational categories. In this case the dependent variable fijtk is the proportion of employees
of occupational category k (in the firm of origin) moving from firm i to firm j in year t relative
to the total number of job-to-job movers that leave firm i in year t. As in Section 4, we consider
four occupational categories: managers, intermediate occupations, clerical support and blue collars,
with blue collars being the excluded category. Results are similar across the two specifications:
firm closure intensifies ILM activity most for blue collar workers and to a lesser extent for the
other occupational categories. More precisely, at closure the fraction of blue collar workers (the
excluded category) redeployed to an affiliated firm increases more than the fraction redeployed to a
non-affiliated firm, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of Closure × Same Group.
The triple interactions of Closure × Same Group with the other occupational categories are all
negative, showing that the stronger effect of the closure shock on internal flows as compared to
external flows is less pronounced for the other types of workers.27,28 Note that, in normal times,
the opposite pattern emerges: the difference between the fraction of workers redeployed to an
ILM destination-firm with respect to the fraction redeployed to a non-affiliated firm is larger for
managers and intermediate occupations relative to blue collars and clerical workers, as indicated by
the coefficient of Same Group interacted with the different occupational categories.
5.1 Employment protection regulation and the ILM
Within the same empirical framework, we investigate which labor market frictions spur ILM activity.
Given the above evidence, labor market regulation is an obvious candidate. We therefore exploit the
27In column (3) and (4), the coefficients of the triple interactions are not significantly different from each other, but
are significantly different from the coefficient of Closure × Same Group at 5%.
28The same pattern – i.e. that ILM activity intensifies following closures within the group and that this effect is
stronger on blue collar workers – also emerges in Tables B1 and B2 in the Online Appendix, where we study the
impact of closures on the excess probabilities presented in section 4.
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fact that labor market regulation in France changes discontinuously at various firm size thresholds.
The consensus view is that the 50-employee threshold is critical, a size above which the regulation
of employment protection and union rights becomes significantly stricter at various moments of
the firm’s life, including around closure.29 Figure 2 shows the distribution of firm size in France,
measured in terms of number of employees: firms seem to bunch just below 50, which suggests that
the stricter EPL that applies above 50 is likely to matter when firms make decisions. Previous work
has studied the distortions that this type of legislation creates by discouraging firms’ expansion.30
We adopt a regression discontinuity-type approach and explore whether group-affiliated firms
above the 50-employee threshold at closure rely disproportionately more on the ILM than firms
below 50, controlling for the intensity of bilateral worker flows in normal times. We therefore
estimate the following model:
fijt = αt + φij + φ0BGjt + φ1SameBGijt + φ2dit + φ3cit ×BGjt + φ4cit × SameBGijt +
φ5D
50
i × SameBGijt + φ6D
50
i ×BGjt + φ7D
50
i × cit + φ8D
50
i ×BGjt × cit +
φ9D
50
i × SameBGijt × cit +Xit + εijt (3)
where the specification in equation (2) is augmented with the time-invariant indicator D50i – equal
to one for firms with 50 or more employees at closure – fully interacted with BGjt, SameBGijt
and cit. We also include two (third or fourth degree) polynomials in firm size at closure separately
for normal times and closure times (in the matrix Xit). The coefficient of interest φ9 measures
the differential impact of closure on within-group flows for firms above 50 versus firms below 50
employees.
To achieve proper identification this approach requires firms to be randomly allocated above and
below the 50-employee threshold. The use of firm (and pair) fixed effects already controls for all the
time-invariant unobserved factors that may affect the propensity of firms to self-select into (or out
of) treatment. However, fixed effects do not account for the selection due to time-varying factors.
To control for such factors, following Leonardi and Pica (2013), we instrument the treatment status
(and all the interacted terms) with the (average) firm size in normal times (and the associated
29In case of collective dismissals (i.e. dismissals of at least 10 workers during a 30 days period), firms with 50+
employees are required to formulate an “employment preservation plan” in close negotiation with union representatives.
The aim of the plan is to lay out solutions to facilitate reemployment of terminated workers. In practice, the obligations
entailed by the plan substantially increase termination costs (by raising both lay-off costs and union bargaining power).
Note that the “employment preservation plan” must be formulated also in the event of a closure. See Appendix A.4.
30In their study of the impact of size-contingent labor laws, Garicano, LeLarge, and VanReenen (2013) focus
precisely on the French 50-employee threshold.
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relevant interactions), i.e. at least four years before closure. The validity of this instrument relies
on the closure being unexpected in normal times.
Table 6 shows results from the estimation of equation (3). Column (1) includes firm-of-origin
fixed effects, column (2) pair fixed effects and column (3) shows IV results (with pair fixed effects)
using firm size in normal times as an instrument for size at closure. The first three columns restrict
to closing firms between 40 and 60 employees. The remaining two columns show robustness checks
using different size windows. Interestingly, the coefficient of Closure×Same Group is positive and
significant, indicating that closures intensify ILM activity even for closing firms with less than
50 employees, which in France are subject to lighter but non-negligible employment protection
legislation. However, the coefficient of the triple interaction Closure×Same Group×Firm Size> 50,
which measures the impact of closure on ILM flows differentially for firms above 50 employees, is
everywhere positive and significant (in column (2) marginally so at 5%). This suggests that group-
affiliated firms hit by adverse shocks increasingly rely on the ILM when employment protection
rules become more stringent. This result allows us, we believe, to establish a causal link between a
specific labor market friction, namely employment protection regulation, and ILM activity.
5.2 Employment insurance provided by the ILM
Our finding that closing group units extensively redeploy labor through the internal labor market
suggests that workers employed in group-affiliated firms are provided with implicit employment
insurance against adverse shocks hitting their company. To corroborate this hypothesis, we study
whether, upon closure, fewer employees of group-affiliated firms become unemployed as compared
with stand-alone firms. Table 7 displays the average ratio of a firm’s employees moving to unem-
ployment over the total number of employees leaving the firm in the same year – in stand-alone
versus group-affiliated firms. At closure (relative to normal times), the proportion of workers that
become unemployed increases in stand-alone firms, whereas this proportion decreases in affiliated
firms.
This unconditional evidence is confirmed by the regression results shown in Table 8 column (1):
the coefficient of Closure × Firm of origin group affiliated is negative and significant. At closure
(relative to normal times) the fraction of workers separating from a group-affiliated firm who become
unemployed is 7.85 percentage points smaller than the fraction of workers that separate from a stand-
alone firm and become unemployed. This indicates that, when the firm is hit by a closure shock,
workers’ exposure to unemployment is 34.2% lower in BG-affiliated firms as compared to stand-
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alone firms. In column (2) of Table 8 we investigate whether this effect differs across occupational
categories: our results show that the effect is significantly larger for blue-collar workers (the excluded
category) and becomes weaker as we move up the skill ladder. This adds further support to the view
that ILMs allow groups to provide employment insurance to employees with fewer outside options
and possibly stronger union support.
We then ask whether the preservation of employment ensured by the internal labor market comes
at a cost for business groups’ employees. Table 9 examines the change in hours worked (columns 1
and 2), in the hourly wage (columns 3 and 4) and in the annual wage (columns 5 and 6), for workers
transiting from firm i to firm j at time t (the unit of observation is now the worker).
The coefficient of Closure × Same Group indicates that closures have a more detrimental effect
on hours worked (as well as on the annual wage) for employees redeployed to an ILM destination-
firm as compared to employees that find a new job in the external labor market, with no differential
impact across the occupational categories. Instead, closure have no differential impact on the hourly
wage (in our baseline specification with pair fixed effects).31 These results suggest that the higher
job stability granted by the group does come at a cost: hours worked are reduced and so does the
annual wage.
5.3 Employment flows at closure: Where do workers go?
We again exploit our difference-in-difference set-up to study the characteristics of those group-firms
that absorb a closure shock by hiring the displaced workers within their ILM.32 If groups run
ILMs efficiently, one would expect them to reallocate displaced employees to firms that are not
experiencing an adverse shock, and ideally to firms that would benefit from absorbing the workforce
of closing units, i.e. well managed firms with profitable growth opportunities. Absorbing firms
must also have the necessary financial muscle to expand their workforce. We explore these issues in
Tables 10 and 11.
In Table 10, we classify firms depending on whether they operate in a booming sector or one
31Managers seem to enjoy an hourly wage premium when moving within the group (Same Group × Managers in
column 3), almost completely dissipated upon closure (Same Group × Closure × Managers). Those effects vanish in
column (4) in which we control for the pair fixed effect, suggesting that the wage premium in normal times is due to
the managers (self) selecting into high-wage firms.
32We can control for firm-level characteristics because we investigate the activity of ILMs within groups of affiliated
firms rather than within firms, as is done in the literature on diversified firms where no independent establishment-level
economic outcomes exist.
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experiencing a downturn (columns 1 and 2), and in low- versus high-growth sectors (column 3).33,34
As for previous results, our main specification controls for pair fixed effects (results are unchanged
when we control instead for firm of origin fixed effects). Column (1) shows that ILM flows increase
at closure time with respect to normal times by 3 percentage points more if the destination firm
is in a booming sector. Column (2) shows that there is instead a negative – albeit non signif-
icant – differential effect if the destination firm is in a sector experiencing a recession. Column
(3) provides evidence that group ILMs reallocate displaced workers more intensely towards group
affiliates operating in high-growth sectors, where firms are more likely to have profitable investment
opportunities.
We explore the above ideas further in Table 11. There, we measure destination firms’ charac-
teristics at the firm-level – rather than at the industry-level – and in “normal times” (i.e. before
being affected by the firm of origin’s closure).35 In columns (1)-(3) we ask whether after a closure,
groups reallocate employees mainly towards larger, more efficiently-run firms, as well as firms that
have been expanding. In particular, in column (2) we classify destination firms according to their
efficiency, as measured by estimated TFP.36 We find that, following closures, ILM flows increase by
5 percentage points more when destination firms have larger-than median TFPs. Column (3) shows
that following a closure in the group, the differential increase in ILM flows is 5 percentage points
larger for destination firms that had undertaken larger than median capital expenditures well before
the closure shock hit the group.
The closure of a group-affiliated firm may well generate an expansion opportunity for its well-
managed, high-growth affiliates, to the extent that hiring costs are lower in ILMs. However, the
33Booms and busts are identified from the fluctuations of real sectoral sales, where nominal sales are deflated by
2-digit industry-specific price deflators (the lower number of observations are due to missing prices for some sectors),
following the Braun and Larrain (2005) peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs occur when (the log of) real sales are below
their trend (computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100) by more than one standard
deviation. For each trough, we go back in time until we find a local peak, which is defined as the closest preceding
year for which (detrended) real sales are higher than in the previous and posterior year. A bust goes from the year
after the local peak to the year of the trough. The same procedure is used to identify sectoral booms. A peak occurs
when current real sales are more than one standard deviation above their trend. Once a peak is identified, we go back
in time until we find a local trough, i.e., the closest preceding year for which (detrended) real sales are lower than in
the previous and posterior year. The years falling between a local trough and a peak are labelled as a boom.
34Sectors are classified according to whether the average annual growth rate of real sales over our sample period
fall in the first decile, above the median, or in the top decile of the distribution.
35The destination firm’s characteristics are averaged over the period that predates the firm of origin’s closure by at
least four years to address the endogeneity concern due to the fact that a firm’s closure is likely to affect the size,
efficiency, investment policy and financial status of both its external and ILM destination-firms. We do so for total
assets, TFP, capital expenditure, debt/assets and interest coverage.
36We estimate TFP following the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which extends the Olley and Pakes (1996)
approach using materials instead of investment to control for firm-level unobserved productivity shocks. Tables A4,
A5, and A6 in the Appendix display labor and capital coefficients as well as estimated TFP for each one-digit sector.
The coefficients reported in Table A4 are in line with those estimated by Garicano, LeLarge, and VanReenen (2013)
on French manufacturing firms. Table A6 shows that group-affiliated firms across all sectors display larger TFP levels
than stand-alone firms (see Boutin, Cestone, Fumagalli, Pica, and Serrano-Velarde (2013) for a similar result).
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ability to seize such opportunities is likely to depend on a firm’s financing capacity. Thus in Table
11 we also investigate whether the reallocation of displaced workers within groups depends on the
financial status of the potential ILM destination-firms. For each destination firm we build two
measures of financial health: leverage (book value of long-term debt divided by total assets) and
interest coverage (earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, divided by interest expense).37
Columns (4) and (5) show that following a closure in the group, the differential increase in ILM
flows varies for destination firms at different percentiles of the distribution of leverage and coverage.
The difference-in-difference effect is significantly smaller for destination firms whose leverage falls
in the top decile of the distribution, and for destination firms with an interest coverage ratio in the
bottom decile. Overall, this suggests that while closures trigger ILM activity, groups are less prone
to redeploy displaced workers to highly levered and financially distressed affiliates.
6 The ILM Response to Positive Shocks: Good Times
To investigate further the co-insurance role of the internal labor market, we now turn to positive
shocks. We ask whether groups rely on their ILMs to expand the labor force in those units that
face an unexpected growth opportunity, as captured by the exit of a large industry competitor. As
pointed out in earlier work (see Lang and Stulz (1992)), a competitor’s death may be due to some
shock specific to the exiting firm, so other firms in the industry should benefit from it, or to some
industry-wide shock, which is bad news for other firms as well. Hence, we must identify those exits
that are not due to industry-wide shocks.
To do so, we first focus on one particular event that affected the French milk industry in 2004:
the collapse of a large foreign competitor following the discovery of a major accounting fraud.
Second, we identify in our sample period episodes of firm closures that we can confidently ascribe
to firm-specific shocks. In both cases, we investigate whether other (group-affiliated) firms in the
shocked industry increased reliance on their ILM in response to this large competitor’s exit.
6.1 Collapse of a large competitor: Parmalat
Until 2004, the Parmalat multinational was a major competitor for the many French firms and
groups operating in the production and sale of milk products. Parmalat’s fallout followed the
sudden discovery, in December 2003, of a huge accounting fraud that led many commentators to
37Very high levels of leverage and very low interest coverage ratios may signal that a firm has limited financing
capacity (possibly due to debt overhang and binding debt covenants), and thus does not enjoy the financial flexibility
necessary to expand its workforce.
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rename it “Europe’s Enron.”38 Following this revelation, Parmalat filed for bankruptcy (see Tayan
and Rajan (2008)). We believe this event is ideal to study how business groups react to this type
of positive shocks.
To check that the Parmalat collapse indeed represented a positive shock for its French com-
petitors, we proceed as follows. We consider the 4-digit industries in which Parmalat was present
in France (the treated industries) and all other 4-digit industries within the same broader 2-digit
industries.39 We analyze the change in a number of variables (employment, sales, total assets, and
property plant and equipment) before and after Parmalat’s collapse, for the ten largest competitors
in each treated industry (relative to the non-top-ten firms) and we compare it with the change in the
same variables for the ten largest firms in all the other industries within the same 2-digit industries.
More precisely, we estimate the following equation:
yits = αt + δs + δ0Top10its + δ1Post2004 + δ2TSs + δ3Top10its × Post2004 +
δ4Top10its × TSs + δ5Post2004× TSs + δ6Top10its × Post2004× TSs + εits (4)
where yits is the (log of) employment (sales, total assets, fixed assets) of firm i, at time t, active
in sector s. Sector s is a 4-digit sector that belongs to the 2-digit industries where Parmalat was
present; the term αt represents a set of year indicators; δs is a 4-digit industry fixed-effect; Top10its
is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i at time t ranks among the first ten largest firms in industry s
in terms of y; Post2004 takes the value 1 after the Parmalat collapse, and TSs represents a set of
indicators that identify the treated industries.
We identify those industries in which the Parmalat’s collapse represented an expansion oppor-
tunity by looking at the coefficient δ6 of the triple interaction, which measures the differential effect
of the Parmalat shock on the major players in the treated sectors as opposed to the major play-
ers in the control industries. We will consider as “shocked” only the treated industries for which
the coefficient δ6 will turn out to be positive and significant at least in the employment and sales
regressions.
Table 12 reports the results of this preliminary stage. We find that δ6 is positive and significant
38By 2003, Parmalat had grown from an Italy-based family firm into a multinational giant owning over 130 sub-
sidiaries in 30 different countries. At the end of 2002, Parmalat reported EUR 10.3 billion in assets, including EUR 3.4
billion in cash and cash equivalents. However, in December 2003, following Parmalat’s default on EUR 150 millions
bonds in spite of its large cash position, Bank of America revealed that a EUR 3.9 billion account held by Parmalat
at the bank did not exist.
39Parmalat operated in France through own local subsidiaries in five 4-digit industries: wholesale milk trade, milk
production, butter, cheese, and other milk production. These industries belong to the “food sale and production”
2-digit industry.
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in the regressions for employment and sales in two 4-digit industries, namely “Wholesale milk trade”
and “Other milk production”. In addition, for those industries a positive effect also shows up for
total and fixed assets. This makes us confident that, at least in these two industries, the major
market players took advantage of Parmalat’s collapse.
We then study the evolution of bilateral employment flows following the Parmalat collapse, in
firm pairs where the destination firm is a group-affiliated company operating in one of these two
“positively-shocked” industries. We study how the flow of workers within firm pairs affiliated with
the same group (the ILM flow) evolves after the positive shock, as opposed to the flow of workers
between firms not affiliated with the same group (the external labor market flow).
We estimate the following equation:
fijt = αt + φij + φ0BGjt + φ1SameBGijt + φ2Post2004 +
φ3Post2004×BGjt + φ4Post2004× SameBGijt + εijt (5)
where fijt is the ratio of employees hired by a group-affiliated firm i (active in one of the shocked
sectors) in year t and previously employed by firm j, to the total number of job-to-job movers hired
by firm i in year t; the term αt represents a set of year indicators; φij is a firm-pair fixed effect in
our main specification; BGjt is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm of origin is affiliated with any
group in year t; SameBGijt takes value 1 if the firm of origin is affiliated with the same group as
firm i, in year t; Post2004 takes the value 1 after the Parmalat collapse. The variable of interest is
the interaction between SameBGijt and Post2004. Its coefficient φ4 captures the differential effect
of the positive shock on the bilateral employment flows (relative to normal times) within firm pairs
that belong to the same group relative to pairs that do not.
We present the estimates of equation (5) in Table 13. There, we present estimates in two subsets
of the milk industries: the shocked ones (‘Wholesale milk trade” and “Other milk production”),
and the three non-shocked ones, where the Parmalat collapse does not appear to have generated an
expansion opportunity. We use the latter to provide a placebo test. Results in Table 13 confirm our
prediction: after 2004, firms in the shocked industries increased the fraction of workers absorbed
from their group’s ILM by 2.9 to 3.5 percentage points more than the fraction of workers hired
on the external labor market (columns 1 and 2). We observe no differential effect in the three
non-shocked industries (columns 3 and 4).
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6.2 Closures of large competitors
To go beyond the Parmalat case, we extend the above approach to any large closure event. More
precisely, we identify closure episodes of firms with more than 500 workers – on average – in normal
times, i.e. at least 4 years prior to the closure event (well before the closing firm starts shrinking).
This allows us to identify 115 large closure events happening in 102 different 4-digit industries.
To be sure that such closures are essentially due to idiosyncratic reasons, we study whether
these events benefit the main competitors in the industry, in which case we can confidently assume
that they do not reflect a negative macroeconomic or sector-wide shock. As in the Parmalat case,
for each closure event, we build a treatment group that includes all firms that operate in the same
4-digit industry as the large closing firm; the control group includes all the other firms present
outside the specific 4-digit industry but in the same 2-digit industry as the closing firm.40 We then
analyze the differential evolution of the variable of interest (employment, sales, total assets and fixed
assets), before and after the closure event, for the top ten firms in the market where the closing
firm was present (vs. the remaining firms) and compare it with the evolution of the same variable
for the ten largest firms in the other industries.
For each closure event and for each variable of interest, we run a regression similar to equation
(4). We look at the coefficient δ6 of the triple interaction Top10its×PostClosure×TSs, where s is
a 4-digit industry that belongs to the 2-digit industry in which the large closing firm was present,
Top10its is an indicator equal to one for the ten largest firms in industry s, PostClosure is an
indicator for the period following the closure event and TSs is an indicator that identifies the 4-
digit industry in which the closing firm operated. Consistently with the Parmalat case study, we
label as “shocked” only the treated industries for which the coefficient δ6 is positive and significant
in, at least, the regressions on employment and sales.
Appendix Tables A7 and A8 show the results of this preliminary stage. We identify 16 indus-
tries (listed in Appendix Table A7) for which the coefficient δ6 of the triple interaction (Top10 ×
PostClosure × TreatedSector) is positive and significant at least in the regressions on the evolu-
tion of employment and sales. In most of the cases, the coefficients for the evolution of total and
fixed assets are also positive and significant. Table A9 shows some descriptive statistics for these
“shocked” industries. Typically the shocked industries experience a single large closure event. In
the few cases with multiple closure events, we take the year of the first closure event as the year of
40We exclude from the control group all 4-digit industries (belonging to the same 2-digit category as the closing
firms) in which there is a large closure event.
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closure. The table also shows the average size of the closing firm in normal times, i.e. at least 4
years prior to the closure event.
We examine the bilateral flows of workers hired by group-affiliated firms in these 16 shocked
industries.41 Table 15 shows the regression results: after the shock, within-group flows go up relative
to flows from the external labour market, both in the specification with firm of origin fixed effects
and in the specification with firm pair fixed effects (columns (1) and (2)). When controlling for
pair fixed effects, we find that firms react to the positive shock increasing the fraction of workers
absorbed from ILM partners by 1 percentage points more than the fraction of workers absorbed
from external labor market firms. Given that after the shock the average flow from an external labor
market firm of origin is 0.0218 (see Table 14), our estimates imply that the increase in flows from
ILM firms of origin is half of the average external flow. Column (3) of Table 15 shows that the effect
is positive and significant in the three years following the shock, and that it vanishes afterwards.42
Interestingly, column (4) shows that the effect is driven by hires in managerial positions. This
supports our prediction that expanding group-affiliated firms rely on the ILM to alleviate search
costs and informational frictions that are particularly pronounced in the external market for skilled
human capital.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 15 provide a placebo test. Column (6) shows the result of
the placebo on the subset of sectors in which the coefficient δ6 in the preliminary stage regressions
concerning sales and employment is not significant.43 Column (5) shows the results of the placebo
on all the sectors in which employment and sales of the top ten competitors did not both go up after
the large closure.44 Reassuringly, in both cases the coefficient of interest is now very small and not
significantly different from zero.
7 Conclusion
Why are some organizations more resilient to shocks than others? Which channels allow them
to swiftly respond to adverse or favorable economic conditions? In this paper we address these
questions by studying how some widespread organizations, namely business groups, cope with shocks
41We remove the flows that originate from the closing firms that are affiliated with groups having units active in the
shocked industries so as to avoid that the hires that we measure are ILM reallocations due to negative shocks hitting
the closing firms.
42Not surprisingly, the effect does not show up in the closure year, that mixes pre- and post-shock behavior.
43These sectors and the coefficients of the preliminary stage regression are listed in Appendix Table A8, panel A.
44These sectors and the coefficients of the preliminary stage regression are listed in Appendix Table A8, panels B
and C.
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using their Internal Labor Markets.45 To this end, we exploit individual measures of mobility
(through a matched employer-employee data set), together with information on the organization’s
structure (i.e., the firms affiliated with a group), and the economic outcomes of the affiliated firms.
Our evidence suggests that ILMs emerge as a mutual insurance mechanism across firms of
diversified groups, allowing them to alleviate both firing and hiring costs. As a by-product of ILM
activity, implicit employment insurance is provided to the organizations’ workers, in particular the
low-skilled.
Results also suggests that such ILMs operate efficiently. Upon closure events, the ILM reallocates
displaced workers more intensely towards units that are more efficient and enjoy better growth
opportunities. The intensity of the ILM flows after a shock also depends on the financial health of
the potential destination firms within the group, in line with the intuition that the ability to seize
the opportunity to draw valuable human capital from the ILM is constrained by a firm’s financing
capacity. We also find that upon closure of a large competitor in a non-declining industry, the ILM
reallocates workers (in particular the high-skilled) more intensely towards group units that benefit
most from the ensuing decreased competitive intensity. In the presence of labor market frictions,
ILMs appear to facilitate the efficient reallocation of human capital across industries and regions in
response to economic shocks.
Measurement is one reason among many that have led us to study complex organizations in the
shape of groups comprising multiple firms rather than firms comprising multiple establishments.
However, we ultimately wish to understand how such complex organizations come to life. Why are
some units added to these organizations and why are some units shut down? The reasons why such
organizations appear in the first place and why they succeed to grow is a long-standing question in
economics. In order to understand the full nature of the benefits associated to groups’ existence,
this paper’s approach has used shocks that affected some of the firms within groups. To delve
further into this comprehension, we will adopt complementary strategies in our next articles. First,
we will examine how policy reforms, as opposed to shocks, affect the existence and structure of
groups versus other organizations. The policy reform we have started to examine is the transition
to the 35-hours workweek, that took place in France over the 2000s. The differential strategies
used by groups versus multi-establishment firms when faced with such reforms should help us in our
endeavor. Second, we also have started to look at how exchange-rate movements affect the structure
of groups in contrast again with that of multi-establishment firms. In particular, by measuring flows
45In a previous analysis, three of the four co-authors studied how reliance on Internal Capital Markets can explain
groups’ resilience and ability to withstand competition (Boutin, Cestone, Fumagalli, Pica, and Serrano-Velarde (2013)).
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of imports, exports, and purchases within France, together with firms’ creation or destruction and
their association with these flows, we will be able to assess the benefits and limits of integration. By
analyzing how groups evolve when faced with the changing environments induced by exchange-rate
movements, and contrasting their reactions with those of different organizations faced with similar
shocks, we hope to have a better understanding of some of the reasons for firms’ creation.
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Figure 1. Evolution of performance indicators for group affiliated closing firms
(a) ROA and ROS (b) Coverage (c) Sales
Note: ROA denotes return on assets; ROS return on sales; coverage is the ratio of EBITDA over interest payments.
Sales are measured in thousands of Euros. Time to closure indicates the number of years before the closure event.
Figure 2. Firm size distribution around the 50 employee threshold (year 2006)
(a) Stand-alone firms (b) Business group affiliated firms (c) All firms
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Table 1. Mean excess probability of within-group job-to-job transitions by year
Panel A: Job transitions between any two occupations Panel B: Job transitions within same occupation
Percentiles Percentiles
Year Mean St.Dev. 10 25 50 75 90 N Mean St.Dev. 10 25 50 75 90 N
Unweighted firm-level aggregation Unweighted firm-level aggregation
2003 0.089 0.231 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.333 37475 0.066 0.202 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.199 34971
2004 0.093 0.237 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.333 36691 0.069 0.209 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.222 34103
2005 0.093 0.237 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.333 38870 0.070 0.210 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.211 36134
2006 0.093 0.237 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.333 41868 0.070 0.210 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.213 39069
2007 0.087 0.229 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.333 44362 0.065 0.201 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.177 41403
2008 0.084 0.226 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.332 47356 0.065 0.202 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.166 44542
2009 0.096 0.242 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.364 40736 0.075 0.218 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.250 38213
2010 0.095 0.244 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.349 42045 0.073 0.217 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.249 39329
Weighted firm-level aggregation Weighted firm-level aggregation
2003 0.083 0.227 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.250 37475 0.062 0.198 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.150 34971
2004 0.087 0.233 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.308 36691 0.065 0.205 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.166 34103
2005 0.087 0.232 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.324 38870 0.065 0.205 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.166 36134
2006 0.086 0.232 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.300 41868 0.065 0.204 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.166 39069
2007 0.081 0.224 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.250 44362 0.061 0.196 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 41403
2008 0.078 0.221 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.250 47356 0.061 0.197 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.142 44542
2009 0.090 0.238 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.333 40736 0.070 0.213 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.199 38213
2010 0.090 0.240 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.333 42045 0.068 0.212 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.175 39329
Note: The left hand side (Panel A) considers job-to-job transitions between any two occupations, where we restrict the set c to be the set of all transitions occurring between
occupation o and occupation z that originate from the same departments in France where firm j’s group is active. In the right-hand side (Panel B), the set c includes only
transitions occurring between occupation o and occupation z in which occupation o is equal to occupation z, restricting to transitions that originate from the same departments
in France where firm j’s group is active. The first column indicates the year in which workers transiting from one job to another were hired by the affiliated firm j. The
upper parts of Panels A and B present simple averages. The bottom part of Panel A shows weighted averages where the weight associated to each γc,j is the ratio of the
number of transitions from occupation o to occupation z that originate from fim j’s group to the total number of transitions (for all the occupation pairs associated with firm
j) that originate from j’s group. The bottom part of Panel B shows weighted averages where the weight associated to each γc,j is the ratio of the number of transitions from
occupation o to occupation z, with o = z, that originate from fim j’s group to the total number of transitions (for all the occupation pairs associated with firm j) that originate
from j’s group.
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Table 2. ILM activity and group diversification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(Log) Firm size 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) Rest of the group size 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
(Log) Number of affiliated firms -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.088*** -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.0909***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.025 -0.020 -0.024 -0.009 -0.024 -0.016 -0.025 -0.013
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018)
Foreign control -0.043 -0.038 -0.042 -0.029 -0.044 -0.039 -0.043 -0.035
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021)
Diversification (Macrosectors) -0.006 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Diversification × Rest of the group size 0.012***
(0.003)
Diversification (4 digit) 0.014* 0.030***
(0.006) (0.006)
Diversification (4d) × Rest of the group size 0.022***
(0.003)
Diversification (Paris Area) 0.039*** 0.022*
(0.008) (0.009)
Diversification × Rest of the group size 0.024***
(0.004)
Diversification (Region) 0.043*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.007)
Diversification (Reg.) × Rest of the group size 0.027***
(0.004)
N 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689
Firm × Group and year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: Excess probability for firm j to hire a worker originating from the same group as j. Firm size is measured by (full time equivalent) total employment;
Rest of the group size is measured by the (full time equivalent) total employment of all the other firms affiliated with the same group as firm j. State Control is an indicator
equal to 1 if the head of the group is state-owned. Foreign Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is located outside France. A group’s Diversification
(macrosectors/4-digit sectors/Paris/Regions) is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of all its affiliated firms’ employment shares, where each share is the ratio
of the total employment of affiliated firms active in a given macrosector (in a given 4-digit sector; in/outside the Paris Area; in a given region) to total group employment.
Macrosectors are agriculture, service, finance, manufacturing, energy, automotive. The variables Rest of the group size, Number of firms in the group, Diversification are
normalized to have zero mean. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level.
Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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Table 3. Heterogeneity of ILM activity by occupation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Log) Firm Size 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) Rest of the group size -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Log) Number of affiliated firms -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign Control -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Occupation of destination (Managers/High-Skill excluded)
Intermediate Occupation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Clerical Support -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Blue Collar -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupation of origin (Managers/High-Skill excluded)
Intermediate Occupation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Clerical Support -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Blue Collar -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Same Occupation -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Same Occupation × Intermediate Occupation -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Same Occupation × Clerical Support -0.005*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Same Occupation × Blue Collar -0.007*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001)
Diversification (4-digit) -0.004 -0.022** -0.008 -0.022*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Div. × Intermediate Occupation (dest.) 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Div. × Clerical Support (dest.) 0.028*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003)
Div. × Blue Collar (dest.) 0.028*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003)
Diversification × Same Occupation 0.009*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.002)
Div. × Int. Occ. × Same Occ. 0.011***
(0.001)
Div. × Clerical Support × Same Occ. 0.024***
(0.002)
Div. × Blue Collar × Same Occ. 0.032***
(0.002)
N 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670
Firm × Group and year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: Excess probability for firm j to hire a worker transiting from occupation o to occupation
z if she originates from the same group as j. Firm size is measured by (full time equivalent) total employment; Rest
of the group size is measured by the (full time equivalent) total employment of all the other firms affiliated with
the same group as firm j. State Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is state-owned. Foreign
Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is located outside France. The occupational categories
are the ones indicated in Table A1 of Appendix A1. The category Managers/High-Skill groups category 2 and 3.
Same Occupation is an indicator equal to 1 if the (2-digit) occupation of origin is equal to the (2-digit) occupation of
destination. Diversification (4-digit) is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of the employment shares
of all firms affiliated with a group, where each share is the ratio of the total employment of affiliated firms active in
a given 4-digit sector to the total group employment. The variable Diversification is normalized to have zero mean.
One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three stars denote
significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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Table 4. Bilateral employment flows: descriptive statistics




























Note: The years to closure indicate the number of years before the firm of origin closes down. For each year we report,
separately for non-affiliated and affiliated destination firms, the average ratio of employees moving in year t from an
affiliated firm of origin i to a destination firm j, to the total number of job-to-job movers leaving firm i in the same
year. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses and the number of observations in square brackets.
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Table 5. Bilateral employment flows: closure vs. normal times
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Destination firm group affiliated -0.0013*** 0.0011 -0.0021*** 0.0015***
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.000) (0.000)
Same Group 0.0334*** -0.0122** 0.0018 -0.0096***
(0.0019) (0.0041) (0.001) (0.001)
Closure × destination firm group affiliated 0.0004 0.0025*** -0.0001 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.000) (0.000)
Closure × Same Group 0.1487*** 0.1187*** 0.0452*** 0.0378***
(0.0039) (0.0050) (0.002) (0.002)
Same Group × Managers 0.0161*** 0.0161***
(0.002) (0.002)
Same Group × Intermediate Occupations 0.0093*** 0.0093***
(0.001) (0.001)
Same Group × Clerical Support 0.0010 0.0010
(0.001) (0.001)
Closure × Same Group × Managers -0.0082** -0.0082**
(0.002) (0.002)
Closure × Same Group × Intermediate Occupations -0.0129*** -0.0129***
(0.002) (0.002)
Closure × Same Group × Clerical Support -0.0112*** -0.0112***
(0.002) (0.002)
N 1,171,552 1,171,552 4,686,112 4,686,112
Firm of origin FE YES NO YES NO
Firm of origin × destination firm FE NO YES NO YES
Year indicators YES YES YES YES
Time to closure indicators YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable in Columns (1) - (2): fraction of employees moving from group-affiliated firm i to firm j in year t to the total number of job-to-job movers leaving
firm i in year t. Dependent variable in Columns (3) - (4): fraction of employees originally undertaking occupation k moving from group-affiliated firm i to firm j in year t to
the total number of job-to-job movers leaving firm i in year t. The occupational categories are the ones indicated in Table A1 in the Appendix. The category Managers groups
category 2 and 3. Firm i is a firm that eventually closes within our sample period. Destination firm group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j is group affiliated.
Same Group is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i and firm j belong to the same group. Closure is an indicator equal to 1 in the last two years of firm i’s activity. All relevant
second and third level interactions are included. In columns (3) and (4) the coefficients of the interactions involving the occupational indicators do not vary across the two
specifications because the (either firm-of-origin or pair) fixed effect is defined at the firm level and does not affect the differential effect of the occupational categories. One
star 5% significance, two stars 1% significance, and three stars 0.1% significance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm of origin level.
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Table 6. Bilateral employment flows and employment protection legislation
FE estimates IV estimates
Firm size window 40-60 40-60 40-60 35-65 45-55
Same Group 0.0381*** 0.0073 0.0325** 0.0165 0.0135
(0.0093) (0.0198) (0.0113) (0.0097) (0.0165)
Destination firm group affiliated -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0029 0.0020 0.0051
(0.0019) (0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0084)
Closure × destination firm group affiliated 0.0018 0.0080* 0.0072 -0.0013 -0.0131
(0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0075)
Closure × Same Group 0.1211*** 0.0785*** 0.0810*** 0.0970*** 0.0933***
(0.0158) (0.0222) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0171)
Closure × Firm size> 50 0.0016 0.0007 -0.0092 -0.0136 -0.0129
(0.0036) (0.0054) (0.0235) (0.0517) (0.0163)
Destination firm group affiliated × Firm size> 50 -0.0019 0.0026 0.0024 -0.0044 -0.0113
(0.0032) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0143)
Same Group × Firm size> 50 -0.0023 -0.0127 -0.0499** -0.0241 -0.0274
(0.0153) (0.0295) (0.0185) (0.0173) (0.0278)
Closure × destination firm group affiliated × Firm size> 50 0.0028 0.0010 0.0024 0.0140 0.0317**
(0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0121)
Closure × same group × Firm size> 50 0.0515* 0.0705 0.0817*** 0.0421* 0.0647*
(0.0261) (0.0370) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0312)
N 53,544 53,544 40,795 56,387 17,855
Firm of origin FE YES NO NO NO NO
Firm of origin × destination firm FE NO YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Time to closure dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: fraction of employees moving from group-affiliated firm i to firm j in year t to the total number of job-to-job movers leaving firm i in year t.
Destination firm group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j is group affiliated. Same Group is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i and firm j belong to the same group.
Closure is an indicator equal to 1 in the last two years of firm i’s activity. In the first two columns Firm size > 50 is a time-invariant indicator taking the value 1 for firms
with 50 or more employees at closure. In the last three columns Firm size > 50 is instrumented using the (average) firm size in normal times, i.e. at least four years before
closure. All relevant second and third level interactions are included. We restrict to closing firms between 40 and 60 employees in the first three columns, between 35 and 65 in
the fourth column, between 45 and 55 in the last column. One star 5% significance, two stars 1% significance, and three stars 0.1% significance. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm of origin level.
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Table 7. Flows to unemployment: descriptive statistics
Stand-alones BG-affiliated firms
0.18818 0.2410





Note: Closure indicates the year of firm closure and the previous year. Normal times indicates more than four years
before closure. We compute the average ratio of employees moving to unemployment in year t from a firm of origin i,
over the total number of employees leaving firm i in year t. Firm of origin i is a firm that eventually closes within our
sample period. The table reports the average ratio at closure and in normal times, separately for stand-alone versus
group-affiliated firms. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses and the number of observations in square
brackets.
Table 8. Flows to unemployment: closures vs. normal times
(1) (2)
Firm of origin group affilliated 0.0538*** 0.0143***
(0.0030) (0.0015)
Closure × Firm of origin group affiliated -0.0785*** -0.0376***
(0.0030) (0.0016)
Closure × Firm of origin affiliated × Managers 0.0324***
(0.0020)
Closure × Firm of origin affiliated × Intermediate Occ. 0.0218***
(0.0020)
Closure × Firm of origin affiliated × Clerical Support 0.0171***
(0.0021)
N 1,606,734 6,593,384
Firm of origin FE YES YES
Year indicators YES YES
Time to closure indicators YES YES
Note: Dependent variable in column (1): fraction of employees moving from firm i to unemployment in year t, to the
total number of employees leaving firm i in year t. Firm i is a firm that eventually closes within our sample period.
Closure is an indicator equal to 1 in the last two years of firm i’s activity. Firm of origin group affiliated is an indicator
equal to 1 if the firm of origin is group affiliated. Dependent variable in column (2): fraction of employees originally
undertaking occupation k and moving from firm i to unemployment in year t to the total number of employees leaving
firm i in year t. The occupational categories are the ones indicated in Table A1. The category Managers groups
category 2 and 3. All relevant second and third level interactions are included. One star denotes significance at the
5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm of origin level
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Table 9. Wage changes: closures vs. normal times by occupational categories
Change in Hours Worked Hourly Wage Change Annual Wage Change
Origin Pair Origin Pair Origin Pair
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Destination firm group affiliated 0.0904*** 0.0483 0.0426*** 0.0295 0.1357*** 0.0724
(0.018) (0.055) (0.006) (0.032) (0.018) (0.055)
Same Group 0.1667*** 0.0482 0.0174 -0.0157 0.1873*** 0.0374
(0.033) (0.046) (0.017) (0.028) (0.035) (0.054)
Closure × destination firm group affiliated -0.0008 0.0353 -0.0123 -0.0142 -0.0136 0.0229
(0.024) (0.053) (0.008) (0.031) (0.025) (0.054)
Closure × Same Group -0.0962* -0.1005* 0.0160 -0.0079 -0.0806 -0.1104*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.019) (0.026) (0.045) (0.051)
Male 0.0391*** 0.0240*** 0.0040** 0.0006 0.0437*** 0.0246***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Age 0.0438*** 0.0304*** -0.0013 -0.0064*** 0.0420*** 0.0239***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Age squared -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0005*** -0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Duration -0.0045*** -0.0039*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** -0.0042*** -0.0036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Same Group × Managers -0.0985* 0.0045 0.1079*** 0.0491 0.0157 0.0629
(0.049) (0.044) (0.026) (0.038) (0.050) (0.053)
Same Group × Intermediate Occupations -0.0214 0.0934 0.0370* 0.0142 0.0086 0.1085
(0.044) (0.062) (0.018) (0.024) (0.046) (0.065)
Same Group × Clerical Support -0.0364 -0.0104 0.0091 0.0216 -0.0261 0.0109
(0.057) (0.067) (0.022) (0.029) (0.062) (0.070)
Closure × Same Group × Managers 0.0830 0.0141 -0.0840** -0.0330 -0.0092 -0.0280
(0.051) (0.044) (0.028) (0.039) (0.051) (0.053)
Closure × Same Group × Intermediate Occupations -0.0098 -0.0888 -0.0262 0.0019 -0.0280 -0.0873
(0.046) (0.063) (0.019) (0.025) (0.048) (0.065)
Closure × Same Group × Clerical Support 0.0415 -0.0047 -0.0238 -0.0175 0.0187 -0.0211
(0.069) (0.068) (0.025) (0.031) (0.071) (0.071)
N 905,089 905,089 905,087 905,087 909,556 909,556
Firm of origin FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Firm of origin × destination firm FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Year indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time to closure indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: In columns (1)-(2) the dependent variable is the percentage change in the number of hours worked of a worker transiting from affiliated firm i to firm j in year t. In
columns (3)-(4) the dependent variable is the percentage change in the hourly wage of a worker transiting from affiliated firm i to firm j in year t. In columns (5)-(6) the
dependent variable is the percentage change in the annual wage of a worker transiting from affiliated firm i to firm j in year t. The occupational categories are as in Table A1
(managers include categories 2 and 3). Destination firm group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j is group affiliated. Same Group is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i
and firm j belong to the same group. Closure is an indicator equal to 1 in the last two years of firm i’s activity. Duration measures the number of days spent by the worker
in the firm of origin. All relevant second and third level interactions are included. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level,
and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm of origin level.
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Table 10. ILM flows at closure and destination firm’s sector (boom/bust and growth)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Destination firm group affiliated -0.004 -0.0004 -0.0107***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0026)
Same Group -0.0291*** -0.0240*** -0.0345***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.0157)
Closure × destination firm group affiliated -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0084***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0025)
Closure × same group 0.1499*** 0.1662*** 0.1255***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.0187)
Destination firm sector in Boom -0.0001
(0.001)
Destination in Boom × Closure -0.0007
(0.001)
Destination in Boom × Same Group -0.0028
(0.009)
Destination in Boom × Closure × Same Group 0.0314*
(0.014)
Destination firm in Bust -0.0011
(0.000)
Destination in Bust × Closure 0.0005
(0.001)
Destination in Bust × Same Group -0.0141
(0.009)
Destination in Bust × Closure × Same Group -0.0159
(0.013)
Sector Growth of Real Sales below 10pct × Closure × Same Group -0.0317*
(0.0135)
Sector Growth of Real Sales above 50pct × Closure × Same Group -0.0098
(0.0153)
Sector Growth of Real Sales above 90pct × Closure × Same Group 0.0318*
(0.0143)
N 688,390 688,390 844,031
Firm of origin × destination firm FE YES YES YES
Year indicators YES YES YES
Time to closure indicators YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: fraction of employees moving from group-affiliated firm i to firm j in year t to the total
number of job-to-job movers leaving firm i in year t. Firm i is a firm that eventually closes within our sample period.
Destination firm group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j is group affiliated. Same Group is an indicator
equal to 1 if firm i and firm j belong to the same group. Closure is an indicator equal to 1 in the last two years of firm
i’s activity. Destination firm in a Boom (bust) is an indicator equal to 1 if the destination firm operates in a (3-digit)
sector that is experiencing a boom (bust) in the year following the closure. Booms and busts are identified from the
fluctuations of real sectoral sales, where nominal sales are deflated by industry-specific price deflators, following the
Braun and Larrain (2005) peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs occur when (the log of) real sales are below their trend
(computed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100) by more than one standard deviation.
For each trough, we go back in time until we find a local peak, which is defined as the closest preceding year for which
(detrended) real sales are higher than in the previous and posterior year. A bust goes from the year after the local
peak to the year of the trough. The same procedure is used to identify sectoral booms. A peak occurs when current
real sales are more than one standard deviation above their trend. Once a peak is identified, we go back in time until
we find a local trough, i.e., the closest preceding year for which (detrended) real sales are lower than in the previous
and posterior year. The years falling between a local trough and a peak are labelled as a boom. Sector Growth of Real
Sales is a variable that measures the growth rate of real sales over the sample period in each 3-digit sector. Sector
Growth of Real Sales below 10pct is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the destination firm j operates in a (3-digit)
sector that belongs to the bottom decile of the distribution of Sector Growth of Real Sales. One star 5% significance,
two stars 1% significance, and three stars 0.1% significance. Standard errors are clustered at the firm of origin level.
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Table 11. ILM flows at closure and destination firm’s size, TFP, investment, and
financial health
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Destination firm group affiliated 0.0059 -0.0019 0.0012 0.0020 0.0017
(0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0016)
Same Group -0.0132 -0.0205 -0.0055 -0.0086 -0.0062
(0.0228) (0.0181) (0.0127) (0.0065) (0.0087)
Closure × destination firm group affiliated 0.0020 0.0042 0.0050** 0.0023** 0.0008
(0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Closure × same group 0.0562* 0.0622** 0.0933*** 0.1416*** 0.1541***
(0.0256) (0.0218) (0.0155) (0.0081) (0.0094)
TA below 10pct × Closure × Same Group -0.0188
(0.0925)
TA above 50pct × Closure × Same Group 0.0561*
(0.0216)
TA above 90pct × Closure × Same Group 0.0570***
(0.0118)
TFP below 10pct × Closure × Same Group -0.0296
(0.0674)
TFP above 50pct × Closure × Same Group 0.0528*
(0.0245)
TFP above 90pct × Closure × Same Group 0.0187
(0.0145)
CAPEXbelow 10pct × Closure × Same Group -0.0290
(0.0253)
CAPEX above 50pct × Closure × Same Group 0.0528**
(0.0179)
CAPEX above 90pct × Closure × Same Group -0.0122
(0.0104)
LEV below 10pct × Closure × same group -0.0456
(0.0236)
LEV above 50pct × Closure × same group 0.0133
(0.0118)
LEV above 90pct × Closure × same group -0.0483*
(0.0233)
COV below 10pct × Closure × same group -0.0367**
(0.0107)
COV above 50pct × Closure × same group -0.0004
(0.0130)
COV above 90pct × Closure × same group -0.0153
(0.0156)
N 705,413 495,042 788,004 700,253 637,665
Firm of origin × destination firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year indicators YES YES YES YES YES
Time to closure indicators YES YES YES YES YES
Note: In columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is the fraction of employees moving from group-affiliated firm i to firm
j in year t to the total number of job-to-job movers leaving firm i in year t. In columns (4)-(5) the dependent variable
is the fraction of employees moving in year t from group-affiliated firm i to any destination-firm j not operating in
the financial sector, divided by the total number of job-to-job movers leaving firm i in year t. Firm i is a firm that
eventually closes within our sample period. Destination firm group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j is group
affiliated. Same Group is an indicator equal to 1 if firm i and firm j belong to the same group. Closure is an indicator
equal to 1 in the last two years of firm i’s activity. The variable TA measures the (average) book value of assets of
destination firm j in “normal times”, i.e. more than four years before the closure of firm i. Since a destination firm
j can be the labor market partner of different firms of origin, each identifying different ‘normal times’, the normal
time value is averaged over all the possible pairs involving firm j. TA below 10pct is an indicator equal to 1 if the
destination firm j belongs to the bottom decile of the distribution of TA. TA above 50pct is an indicator equal to 1
if the destination firm j’s TA is above the median. TA above 90pct is an indicator equal to 1 if the destination firm
j belongs to the top decile of the distribution of TA. Similar results hold if we measure firm size by the book value
of Property, Plants and Equipment. The variable TFP measures the (average) value of TFP of destination firm j in
normal times. Firm j’s TFP is recovered from the labor and capital coefficients estimated using the Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) methodology by 1-digit sectors (according to the NAF 2008 classification). The estimation has been
done on the population of French firms appearing in FICUS between 2002 and 2010. CAPEX measures (average)
investment in tangible assets of destination firm j in “normal times”. LEV measures the (average) ratio of long-term
debt to total assets of destination firm j in “normal times”. COV measures the (average) ratio of EBITDA to interest
expense of destination firm j in “normal times”. All relevant second and third level interactions are included. One
star 5% significance, two stars 1% significance, and three stars 0.1% significance. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm of origin level. 40
Table 12. Effect of Parmalat collapse on its French competitors’ performance
Sales Employment Total Assets Fixed Assets
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 10 × Wholesale Milk Trade × Post2004 0.1779*** 0.2383*** 0.1210* 0.1278**
(0.0459) (0.0324) (0.0511) (0.0466)
Top 10 × Other Milk Production × Post2004 0.4343*** 0.2282*** 0.5029*** 0.3438***
(0.0466) (0.0324) (0.0509) (0.0473)
Top 10 × Milk Production × Post2004 0.0124 -0.3459*** 0.2670*** -0.1436**
(0.0459) (0.0324) (0.0512) (0.0468)
Top 10 × Butter × Post2004 0.1058* 0.0637 0.0661 -0.9385***
(0.0467) (0.0327) (0.0539) (0.0472)
Top 10 × Cheese × Post2004 -0.1081* 0.0253 -0.1438** -0.0537
(0.0465) (0.0324) (0.0511) (0.0471)
N 1,489,260 1,004,524 1,321,175 1,215,149
Sector FE YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Note: All outcome variables are in logs. The table also includes the lower level interaction terms between Top 10
(indicator equal to 1 if the firm ranks among the first 10 in the 4-digit industry), Post2004 (indicator equal to 1 after
the Parmalat collapse, i.e. after 2004) and the relevant 4-digit industry indicator. Fixed Assets is property plant and
equipment. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three
stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit sector level.
Table 13. Bilateral employment flows following the Parmalat 2004 shock
Shocked Sectors Non Shocked Sectors
Destination FE Pair FE Destination FE Pair FE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Group 0.0135 0.0066 0.0277*** 0.0230*
(0.0096) (0.0217) (0.0055) (0.0107)
Firm of origin group affiliated 0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0013
(0.0037) (0.0070) (0.0014) (0.0027)
Post2004 × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0040 -0.0038 -0.0009 -0.0002
(0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Post2004 × same group 0.0293* 0.0350* -0.0035 -0.0013
(0.0118) (0.0143) (0.0066) (0.0071)
N 22,219 22,219 50,013 50,013
Firm of destination FE YES NO YES NO
Firm of origin × firm of destination FE NO YES NO YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: fraction of employees hired by group-affiliated firm i (active in a shocked or non-shocked
sector) in year t and previously employed by firm j, to the total number of job-to-job movers hired by firm i in year t.
Firm of origin group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j is group affiliated. Same Group an indicator equal
to 1 if firm i and firm j belong to the same group. Post2004 is an indicator equal to 1 after the Parmalat collapse,
i.e. after 2004. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three
stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm of destination level.
Table 14. Descriptives on bilateral flows before and after the closure of a large competitor
Extra-group Flows Within-group Flows
Before the shock 0.0215 0.0638
(0.0983) (0.1875)
[183,429] [6,173]




Table 15. Bilateral employment flows and large competitors’ closures
Shocked Sectors Non Shocked Sectors
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm of origin group affiliated 0.0004 0.0037*** 0.0043*** -0.0033*** 0.0014*** 0.0020***
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Same Group 0.0271*** 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0012 0.0021 0.0032
(0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0023)
Post shock × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0028*** -0.0037*** -0.0010 -0.0037*** -0.0044***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Post shock × Same Group 0.0058* 0.0115*** 0.0013 0.0006 0.0008
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0018)
Shock year × Same Group 0.0062
(0.0040)
Shock year + 1 × Same Group 0.0112*
(0.0043)
Shock year + 2 × Same Group 0.0107*
(0.0042)
Shock year + 3 × Same Group 0.0200***
(0.0046)
Shock year + 4 × Same Group 0.0116
(0.0070)
Shock year + 5 and 6 × Same Group 0.0078
(0.0069)
Shock year × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0013
(0.0008)
Shock year + 1 × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0005
(0.0008)
Shock year + 2 × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0066***
(0.0009)
Shock year + 3 × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0043***
(0.0009)
Shock year + 4 × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0056***
(0.0012)
Shock year + 5 and 6 × firm of origin group affiliated -0.0101***
(0.0013)
Post shock × Same Group × Managers 0.0053*
(0.0024)
Post shock × Same Group × Intermediate Occupations -0.0010
(0.0020)
Post shock × Same Group × Clerical Support 0.0021
(0.0015)
N 575,366 575,366 575,366 2,301,464 3,817,969 1,956,489
Firm of destination FE YES NO NO NO NO NO
Firm of origin × firm of destination FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time to shock dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable in Columns (1), (2), (3) and (5) and (6): fraction of employees moving from firm j to
group-affiliated firm i in year t to the total number of job-to-job movers hired by firm i in year t. Dependent variable
in Column (4): fraction of employees moving from firm j to affiliated firm i undertaking occupation k in year t to
the total number of job-to-job movers hired by firm i in year t. The occupational categories are the ones indicated in
Table A1. The category Managers groups category 2 and 3. Firm i is a group-affiliated firm that operates in a sector
in which a large competitor closes during our sample period. Firm of origin group affiliated is an indicator equal to 1
if firm j is group affiliated. Same Group is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j and firm i belong to the same group. Post
Shock is an indicator equal to 1 starting from the closure year. We denote as the closure year the last year of activity
of a given firm. Shock year+1 is an indicator equal to 1 in the year after the closure. All relevant second and third
level interactions are included. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1%
level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the destination firm level.
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A Appendix
A.1 Professional categories in the DADS
Table A1. Professional categories in the DADS
CODE CATEGORY
10 Farmers
2 Top manager/Chief of firms
21 Top managers/chiefs of handicraft firms
22 Top managers/chiefs of industrial/commercial firms with less than 10 employees
23 Top managers of industrial/commercial firms with more than 10 employees
3 Management and superior intellectual occupations
31 Healthcare professionals, legal professionals and other professionals
33 Managers of the Public Administration
34 Professors, researchers, scientific occupations
35 Journalists, media, arts and entertainment occupations
37 Administrative and commercial managers
38 Engineers and technical managers
4 Intermediate occupations
42 Teachers and other education, training and library occupations
43 Healthcare support occupations and social services occupations
44 Clergy and religious occupations
45 Intermediate administrative occupations in the Public Administration
46 Intermediate administrative and commercial occupations in firms
47 Technicians
48 Supervisors and ’agents de maitrise’
5 Clerical Support and Sales occupations
52 Clerical support occupations in the Public Administration
53 Surveillance and security occupations
54 Clerical support in firms
55 Sales and related occupations
56 Personal service occupations
6 Blue collar occupations
62 Industrial qualified workers
63 Handicraft qualified workers
64 Drivers
65 Maintenance, repair and transport qualified workers
67 Industrial non qualified workers




A.2 Estimation of the excess probability to absorb a worker already employed
in the group







= βc,j,t + γc,j,t + u˜
BG
c,j,t (6)
where RBGc,j,t is the fraction of workers that, in year t, are hired by firm j among all workers moving
from occupation o to z whose firm of origin k belongs to the same group as firm j. This fraction
might be high because firm j tends to overhire workers moving between occupations o and z and
happens to be part of a group intensive in occupation o. In this case, one observes many transitions
from occupation o to occupation z in firm j originating from j’s group, but this cannot be ascribed
to the internal labor market channel.
We then compute the fraction of workers that are hired by firm j among all workers moving





= βc,j,t + u˜
−BG
c,j,t (7)
Notice that the subscript k disappears since we sum over all firms of origin, hence over all k’s.





c,j,t = γc,j,t + u
G
i,j,t. (8)
We estimate the parameter γc,j,t for each occupation pair-firm as the difference between two
probabilities: that of a given firm j absorbing workers (transiting between two occupations o and
z) who are separating from affiliated firms, and that of a given firm j absorbing workers (transiting
between two occupations o and z) who are separating from non-affiliated firms for every year t.
Result: The coefficient γ̂c,j,t estimated in equation (8) is equal to the coefficient obtained from
direct estimation of equation (1).
Proof. The coefficient from the linear probability model in equation (1), estimated on a sample of
N individuals, for given occupations of origin and destination, and a given firm of destination j, in
























where N is the number of workers belonging to the set c.
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Since βOLSc,j = Ec,j − γ
OLS
























































































as in equation (6). Next, substituting (9) into βOLSc,j = Ec,j − γ
OLS
c,j BGj , we get:
















as in equation (7).
In order to estimate our parameter of interest, γc,j,t, for each year t and each occupation pair
{o, z}, we identify the set of workers c moving from occupation o to occupation z between year t−1
and year t. Then, we associate each occupation pair {o, z} with a firm j. For each triplet {o, z, j},
we separate those transitions that originate from the same group as firm j from those transitions
that do not. This allows us to compute the denominators of the ratios RBGc,j,t and R
−BG
c,j,t defined in
(6) and (7).46 For each triplet {o, z, j}, we then compute the number of workers transiting from
occupation o to occupation z that are hired by firm j, distinguishing between those that originate
from the same group as firm j and those that do not. This allows us to compute the numerators
of the ratios RBGc,j,t and R
−BG
c,j,t defined in (6) and (7), and ultimately to estimate our parameter of
interest γc,j,t for each triplet.
46We then drop the triplets in which this distinction cannot be drawn because either all the transitions originate
from j’s group or all the transitions originate from the external labor market. Trivially, on those sets of workers it
is not possible to identify the excess probabilities. This restriction is without loss of identifying variation since the
discarded observations are uninformative conditional on the fixed effects.
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To ensure that the internal and external labor markets are as homogeneous as possible, we
restrict attention to the transitions occurring between occupation o and occupation z originating
from firms k that are in geographical areas (French departments) where firm j’s group is active.47
With this restriction, we have approximately one million ILM estimates per year.
A broader definition of c is the set of workers moving within a given occupation pair in the whole
French economy. This definition may raise the concern that the subset of workers originating from
firm j’s group and the subset originating from any other firm in France are not homogeneous. This
is particularly relevant if a group’s units are all located within the same department: then, all the
transitions originating from the group will also originate from that particular department, whereas
the transitions originating from outside the group may come from any department in France. In
this respect, the two pools of workers firm j can draw upon are not fully comparable. Excess
probabilities γc,j,t computed using this broader definition of c turn out to be slightly higher than
the ones obtained imposing the department restriction. The same holds when we compute excess
probabilities imposing a region restriction, i.e. define c as the set of workers moving within an
occupation pair in the same regions where firm j’s group operates. The corresponding tables are
available upon request.
47In the administrative division of France, departments represent one of the three levels of government below the
national level, between the region and the commune. There are 96 departments in mainland France and 5 overseas
departments. We focus on mainland France.
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics
Mean St.dev. Min Max N
γjt 0.091 0.23 -0.63 1 289,689
Firm size (empl.) 157.83 1468.45 0.005 217640 289,689
(Log) Firm size 3.593 1.481 -5.298 12.291 289,689
Rest of the group size (empl.) 10955 29375.43 0.001 349038 289,689
(Log) Rest of the group size 6.107 2.786 -6.908 12.763 289,689
Number of 4 digit sectors 11.52 18.57 1 92 289,689
Number of macrosectors 1.88 0.99 1 6 289,689
Number of regions 5.4 6.45 1 22 289,689
Diversification (macro sectors) -0.87 0.18 -1 -0.26 289,689
Diversification (4-digit sectors) -0.58 0.27 -1 -0.08 289,689
Diversification (Paris) -0.85 0.19 -1 -0.5 289,689
Diversification (Regions) -0.71 0.30 -1 -0.08 289,689
% of firms that close 0.015 0.12 0 1 289,689
# of firm closures in the rest of the group (in year t) 1.76 5.45 0 68 289,689
# of firm closures in the rest of the group (in year t-1) 1.98 5.75 0 68 289,689
% of firms affiliated with groups in which 0.28 0.45 0 1 289,689
at least one (other) firm closes down (in year t)
% of firms affiliated with groups in which 0.32 0.46 0 1 289,689
at least one (other) firm closed down (in year t-1)
# of plant closures in the group (in year t) 16.23 92.27 0 2149 289,689
# of plant closures in the group (in year t-1) 18.9 101.92 0 2149 289,689
% of firms affiliated with groups in which 0.45 0.50 0 1 289,689
at least one (other) plant closes down (in yeat t)
% of firms affiliated with groups in which 0.50 0.50 0 1 289,689
at least one (other) plant closed down (in yeat t-1)
Note: Firm size is measured as the total number of (full time equivalent) employees; Rest of the group size is measured
as the total number of (full time equivalent) employees in firm j’s group, except firm j. A group’s Diversification
(macro sectors/4-digit sectors/Paris/Regions) is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of all its affiliated
firms’ employment shares, where each share is the ratio of the total employment of affiliated firms active in a given
macrosector (in a given 4-digit sector; in/outside the Paris Area; in a given region) to total group employment.
Macrosectors are agriculture, service, finance, manufacturing, energy, automotive. We denote as firm/plant closure a
situation in which a firm/plant sees its employment drop by more than 90% from one year to the other. We do not
consider as closures events where more than 70% of the lost employment ends up in the same firm/plant. We denote
as closure year a firm/plant’s last year of activity, before at least 90% of the firm/plant’s workforce is lost. For a given
affiliated firm j, # of firm closures in the rest of the group (in year t) measures the number of firms in the rest of the
group that close in year t, i.e. that are in their last year of activity in year t. # of firm closures in the rest of the
group (in year t-1) measures the number of firms in the rest of the group that closed in year t − 1, i.e. that were in
their last year of activity in year t− 1. The descriptive statistics displayed in this table are computed using firm-level
data. Hence, large groups are over-represented and the average group characteristics are larger than those computed
using data at the group level and mentioned in footnote 18.
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A.3 Closures rates
Table A3. Firm closures
Number of closing firms Percentage of closing firms
All firms < 10 employees ≥ 10 employees All firms < 10 employees ≥ 10 employees
2002 134,398 117,898 16,500 9.03 10.25 4.87
2003 130,538 114,079 16,459 8.68 9.78 4.88
2004 135,848 123,211 12,637 8.92 10.30 3.73
2005 123,244 109,912 13,332 8.13 9.38 3.88
2006 128,429 114,978 13,451 8.21 9.49 3.82
2007 136,002 121,576 14,426 8.54 9.91 3.95
2008 115,529 105,122 10,407 7.15 8.40 2.74
2009 158,014 139,456 18,558 9.63 10.99 5.01
Note: We denote as closure a drop in employment from one year to the next by 90% or more. In order to avoid
denoting as a closure a situation in which a firm simply changes identifier, we remove all the cases in which more than
70% of the lost employment ends up in a single other firm.
A.4 Labor market regulation in France
In this section we briefly summarize the main pillars of employment protection regulation in France,
regarding the termination of indefinite duration contracts. We refer to Abowd and Kramarz (2003)
for more details on both indefinite and fixed duration contracts.
The termination of indefinite duration contracts under French Labor Law falls under different
categories: dismissal for economic reasons (be it a single or a collective dismissal); dismissal for
personal cause (be it for “serious reason” or “very serious misconduct”); early and normal retirement.
With the exception of terminations for “very serious misconduct”, in all other terminations the
employer must (i) observe a mandatory advance notice period and (ii) pay a severance payment.
The advance notice period (the delay between the formal notice letter announcing the termination
and the end of the employment contract) varies between 1 and 3 months, depending on the worker’s
seniority. Severance payments must be paid to workers with at least two years seniority: for
every year of seniority, the employer pays 1/10 of the wage if the worker is paid by the month. An
additional payment is due for every year of service beyond 10. Employees who are fired for economic
reasons also enjoy employment priority within the firm for 1 year after the termination date, and
have 1 year to dispute the dismissal.
Dismissals can only be justified in case of a “genuine and serious cause”. Valid economic reasons
for termination include the destruction of the worker’s job, the transformation of the job or the
worker’s refusal to sign a new contract when a modification of the labor contract is necessary. These
events are usually due either to technological change within the firm or bad economic conditions.
The employer must follow a strict procedure in notifying the dismissal and providing a justification
for it. If the procedure is overlooked, or the dismissal deemed unfair by a court, the employee is
entitled to additional compensation (normally at least 6 months salary). While a firm’s closure
represents a legitimate cause for dismissal, common procedural errors can still trigger additional
compensation to employees in case of dismissals prompted by the firm’s closure.
In sum, the complex termination procedure and the penalties involved in case of a successful
dispute impose non negligible termination costs that add to the advance notice and severance
payment. This is particularly true in the case of large collective terminations in firms with 50 or
more employees. Indeed, the termination of less than 10 workers during a 30-day period must follow
a procedure similar to individual terminations: the employer must consult the personnel delegate
or the union representatives, notify the Ministry of Labor in writing, provide an exit interview to
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the employee and possibly a retraining program. However, for firms with 50 or more employees, the
dismissal of at least 10 workers during a 30-day period requires a much more complex procedure,
detailed by the 2 August 1989 law. Before engaging in the collective termination, these larger
firms must formulate a “social plan” (recently renamed as “employment preservation plan”) in
close negotiation with staff and union representatives. This is mandatory also in case of collective
terminations prompted by the firm’s closure.
The employment preservation plan must try to limit the total number of terminations, and facil-
itate reemployment of the terminated workers (e.g., by retraining and redeploying them internally
or within the firm’s group if possible). The procedure required to formulate and negotiate the plan
is fairly long, especially if it is disputed. It involves several meetings with staff and union represen-
tatives. During this period, the Ministry of Labor is kept informed about the process, and must
verify that the procedure has been followed correctly. Along the process, the plan can be disputed
by unions and staff representatives, for instance on the ground that not all dismissals are justified
or not all reallocation options have been considered.
A.5 TFP estimation
Table A4. TFP: Labor and capital coefficients in the production function
Sector Labor Coefficient Capital Coefficient
Accommodation and food services 0.3186 0.1690
Administrative services 0.7085 0.0506
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.4840 0.0774
Construction 0.4771 0.0847
Educational services 0.5466 0.0419
Healthcare and social assistance 0.2331 0.0201
ICT 0.7183 0.0582
Manufacturing 0.5420 0.0982
Mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction 0.5015 0.0566
Other services 0.5485 0.0897
Professional, scientific and technical services 0.6747 0.0186
Real estate 0.5852 0.1083
Retail and wholesale trade 0.5340 0.0855
Transportation and warehousing 0.5441 0.1075
Utilities 0.3851 0.2275
Water production and distribution 0.4804 0.1625
Note: Labor and capital coefficients are estimated following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) separately for each 1-digit
sector (NAF 2008 classification) on the universe of French firms between 2002 and 2010. We deflate value added and
materials using 2-digit sector prices and the gross capital stock using a 2-digit sector capital goods deflator. The
empirical specification includes year indicators.
Table A5. Estimated TFP across sectors
Sector Mean Median N
Accommodation and food services 3.3811 3.4205 1,009,928
Administrative services 3.8606 3.8805 221,507
Arts, entertainment and recreation 3.8149 3.8371 62,995
Construction 4.0717 4.0943 1,385,275
Educational services 3.9390 3.9696 95,362
Healthcare and social assistance 4.9364 4.9011 518,821
ICT 3.9940 4.0661 184,040
Manufacturing 3.9310 3.9080 730,105
Mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction 5.2440 5.2614 3,101
Other services 3.3666 3.4194 472,083
Professional, scientific and technical services 4.4120 4.4710 622,463
Real estate 3.7624 3.8288 219,777
Retail and wholesale trade 3.8601 3.9246 2,116,558
Transportation and warehousing 3.9705 4.0094 263,143
Utilities 4.0681 4.2005 2,207
Water production and distribution 3.9865 4.0195 27,761
Note: TFP is estimated following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) separately for each 1-digit sector (NAF 2008 classifi-
cation) on the universe of French firms between 2002 and 2010. We deflate value added and materials using 2-digit
sector prices and the gross capital stock using a 2-digit sector capital goods deflator. The empirical specification
includes year indicators.
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Table A6. Estimated TFP across sectors: stand-alone vs. group-affiliated firms
Sector Stand-alone firms BG-affiliated firms
3.3419 4.6067
Accommodation and food services (3.3982) (4.6328)
[978,639] [31,289]]
3.7760 4.4867
Administrative services (3.8209) (4.4407)
[195,140] [26,367]
3.7278 5.0297






Educational services (3.9480) (4.8836)
[91,805] [3,557]
4.9179 6.2063









Mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction (4.8949) (5.7519)
[1,780] [1,321]
3.3561 4.1942
Other services (3.4142) (4.1483)
[466,132] [5,951]
4.3742 4.9070
Professional, scientific and technical services (4.4421) (4.9050)
[578,319] [44,144]
3.7045 4.4790
Real estate (3.7954) (4.5085)
[205,235] [14,542]
3.7937 4.6031
Retail and wholesale trade (3.8741) (4.6445)
[1,942,897] [173,661]
3.8714 4.7013






Water production and distribution (3.8872) (4.6985)
[22,073] [5,728]
Note: TFP is estimated following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) separately for each 1-digit sector (NAF 2008 classifica-
tion) on the universe of French firms between 2002 and 2010. We deflate value added and materials using 2-digit sector
prices and the gross capital stock using a 2-digit sector capital goods deflator. The empirical specification includes
year indicators. Median values are reported in parenthesis, and the number of observations in squared brackets.
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A.6 Large closures as positive shocks
Table A7. Effect of large firm closures on competitors’ performance – Part I






















































































































































Note: Estimated coefficients of the triple interaction term (Top10×PostClosure×TreatedSector) from the regressions
on sales, employment, total assets and fixed assets (i.e., property plant and equipment). The included sectors are
those for which the coefficient is positive and significant in both the sales and employment regressions. The remaining
ones are in Table A8. All outcome variables are in logs. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote
significance at the 1% level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors are clustered at the
4-digit sector level.
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Table A8. Effect of large firm closures on competitors’ performance – Part II
Code Sector Sales Employment Fixed Assets Total Assets
Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.
Panel A
155C Manufacture of cheese 0.0567 (0.1120) 0.056 (0.0653) -0.0538 (0.0973) -0.0885 (0.0948)
158A Industrial manufacture of bread and fresh pastry 0.0979 (0.0762) 0.0184 (0.0572) 0.1365** (0.0696) 0.1462** (0.0653)
158P Processing of tea and coffee 0.182 (0.1342) -0.0227 (0.0951) 0.3542** (0.1309) 0.4039*** (0.1351)
174C Manufacture of other made-up textile articles -0.0828 (0.0860) 0.0076 (0.0691) -0.1659 (0.0992) -0.101 (0.0626)
211C Manufacture of paper and paperboard 0.4775 (0.2567) 0.0643 (0.1506) 0.2749 (0.3059) 0.415 (0.2286)
212E Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites 0.2567 (0.3281) 0.2485 (0.1699) -0.1344 (0.2956) 0.3329 (0.2191)
222C Printing n.e.c. -0.0648 (0.1245) -0.1083 (0.1394) -0.0294 (0.1385) -0.1544 (0.1018)
241J Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 0.2246 (0.1708) 0.0677 (0.0800) 0.0539 (0.1530) -0.0719 (0.1234)
251E Manufacture of other rubber products -0.1245 (0.1126) -0.1283 (0.1078) -0.2645** (0.1045) -0.1652** (0.0769)
252C Manufacture of plastic packing goods -0.0712 (0.1114) -0.2103 (0.1057) -0.1239 (0.1036) -0.1026 (0.0767)
252H Manufacture of plastic-based technical parts -0.0422 (0.1054) -0.0152 (0.0968) 0.0148 (0.0793) -0.0055 (0.1009)
271Y Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys -0.3344 (0.3665) -0.3019 (0.2671) -0.4736 (0.4892) -0.6421 (0.4019)
284B Cutting, pressing -0.3154 (0.2233) -0.1033 (0.2154) -0.3335 (0.2529) -0.3579 (0.2532)
287G Manufacture of fasteners and screw machine products -0.0202 (0.0761) -0.0299 (0.0585) 0.2717*** (0.0830) -0.0394 (0.0784)
312A Manufacture of low tension electricity distribution and control apparatus -0.2312 (0.1588) 0.0022 (0.1029) -0.2777 (0.1737) -0.0323 (0.1285)
321C Manufacture of electronic active components 0.121 (0.1953) 0.1131 (0.1553) 0.1836** (0.0358) 0.4451 (0.2184)
332B Manufacture of scientific instruments 0.0783 (0.1251) 0.0791 (0.1001) -0.0199 (0.1377) 0.244 (0.1410)
333Z Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 0.3769 (0.4855) 0.2413 (0.4318) 0.1533 (0.4911) 0.3922 (0.5689)
361C Manufacture of other office and shop furniture -0.0731 (0.1005) 0.1156 (0.1006) -0.0469 (0.1334) -0.0115 (0.0835)
503A Wholesale of motor vehicle parts and accessories -0.1897 (0.1397) 0.0043 (0.1005) -0.1746 (0.2648) -0.317 (0.1991)
524H Retail sale of furniture -0.1131 (0.0745) 0.0526 (0.0787) -0.1463 (0.1165) 0.0388 (0.0861)
551A Tourism hotels and motels with restaurant -0.0594 (0.1271) 0.0069 (0.0691) -0.1728 (0.0995) 0.0406 (0.0661)
552E Other provision of tourist lodgings -0.2419 (0.2629) 0.0171 (0.1911) -0.2134 (0.2096) -0.0791 (0.1732)
553B Fast food restaurants -0.2298 (0.2077) -0.0248 (0.1311) -0.0279 (0.1629) -0.11 (0.1164)
602M Interurban freight transports by road -0.0489 (0.1773) -0.3054 (0.185) -0.0777 (0.2802) -0.1931 (0.2364)
634B Chartering 0.1338 (0.2922) 0.3158 (0.2025) 0.9454 (0.5502) 0.3389 (0.4055)
642C Telecommunications, except radio and television transmission -0.2472 (0.5263) 0.0374 (0.2398) -0.3482 (0.3337) -0.2823 (0.3509)
702A Letting of dwellings 0.2723 (0.1662) 0.213 (0.1452) 0.4838 (0.2982) 0.2892** (0.1412)
703C Management of residential building on a fee or contract basis 0.1791 (0.2393) 0.1279 (0.2041) 0.091 (0.34) -0.0779 (0.216)
723Z Data processing -0.0441 (0.2258) 0.1219 (0.1764) 0.0632 (0.2057) -0.083 (0.2981)
745B Temporary work -0.0899 (0.12) -0.1679 (0.1389) -0.3882*** (0.1147) -0.0843 (0.1707)
748B Film processing -0.4295 (0.2528) -0.0335 (0.2390) -0.1931 (0.2152) -0.5176 (0.3689)
748D Packaging activities -0.0827 (0.2016) 0.0939 (0.1922) 0.1277 (0.1695) 0.1059 (0.2850)
Panel B
151E Industrial production of meat products -0.1239 (0.0907) -0.1562*** (0.0544) -0.1699** (0.0794) -0.0827 (0.0791)
158V Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 0.125 (0.0765) -0.1083** (0.0562) 0.1323** (0.0661) 0.0044 (0.0646)
159J Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines -0.0005 (0.0770) -0.207*** (0.0572) -0.0242 (0.0697) -0.0194 (0.0667)
177C Manufacture of knitted and crocheted pullovers and similar articles -0.1914** (0.0693) -0.2983*** (0.0459) -0.2584*** (0.0859) -0.4604*** (0.0525)
193Z Manufacture of footwear 0.0465 (0.0470) -0.1751*** (0.0081) 0.0972 (0.0447) 0.0058 (0.0491)
262C Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures -0.2108** (0.1016) 0.5602*** (0.2001) -1.2667*** (0.1480) 0.732*** (0.0800)
273G Wire drawing -0.7209*** (0.1384) -0.481*** (0.1054) -0.076 (0.1905) -0.3254** (0.1407)
274C Production of basic aluminium -0.1579 (0.1741) -0.4672*** (0.1300) -0.4488** (0.2304) -0.4841** (0.1608)
274D First processing of aluminium -0.4707*** (0.1388) -0.1522 (0.1018) -0.5858*** (0.1919) -0.4055** (0.1398)
275E Casting of light metals -0.4709*** (0.1307) -0.203** (0.0886) -0.634*** (0.1381) -0.2364** (0.1075)
282D Manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers -0.2071** (0.0747) 0.04 (0.0593) -0.0837 (0.0839) -0.1415** (0.0769)
285D Machining, except turning -0.3001** (0.1090) -0.2024** (0.0975) -0.2093 (0.1272) -0.2665** (0.1135)
297C Manufacture of non-electric domestic appliances -0.2412*** (0.0632) -0.4931*** (0.0526) 0.0298 (0.0629) -0.3638*** (0.0526)
311B Manufacture of high power electric motors, generators and transformers -0.5346*** (0.0927) -0.051 (0.0529) -0.0374 (0.0731) -0.5803*** (0.0694)
316A Manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c. -0.5783*** (0.1686) -0.876*** (0.1224) -0.8024** (0.2476) -0.3809** (0.1795)
316D Manufacture of electric equipments n.e.c -0.291** (0.0928) -0.0673 (0.0528) 0.3278*** (0.0733) -0.0895 (0.0697)
322B Manufacture of wired telecommunication equipment 0.0708 (0.1713) -0.2625** (0.0839) -0.4345*** (0.0190) -0.1622 (0.1865)
351B Building of civilian ships -0.1356 (0.1288) -0.3016** (0.1390) -0.632*** (0.1319) 0.1637 (0.1135)
351E Building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats -0.6868** (0.3232) -0.0656 (0.2613) 0.283 (0.3742) 0.0203 (0.3353)
361A Manufacture of chairs and seats -0.3415*** (0.0949) -0.3873*** (0.1114) -0.3353** (0.1370) -0.2785*** (0.0892)
402C Distribution and trade of gaseous fuels through mains -0.1741** (0.0719) -0.7448*** (0.0736) 0.4156** (0.1277) -0.6247** (0.2069)
452C Construction of civil engineering structures -0.2342*** (0.0528) 0.1135** (0.0463) -0.0794 (0.0482) -0.2134*** (0.0444)
452D Underground works 0.1282** (0.0531) -0.1348*** (0.0464) -0.301*** (0.0491) -0.1686*** (0.0444)
511R Agents specializing in the sale of particular products -0.1839** (0.0756) 0.1707*** (0.0597) -0.2969*** (0.0964) -0.3787*** (0.0644)
512A Wholesale of grain, seeds and animal feeds -0.2002** (0.0954) 0.1315** (0.0740) -0.0365 (0.1151) 0.2076** (0.0864)
521A Retail sale of frozen products -0.3019*** (0.0626) -0.0868 (0.0656) -0.0194 (0.0970) -0.3047*** (0.0703)
524L Retail sale of electrical household appliances and radio and television goods -1.329*** (0.0563) -1.6156*** (0.0567) -1.4642*** (0.0567) -1.6079*** (0.0482)
526G Home sale 0.5699*** (0.0798) -0.1062** (0.0581) -0.0692 (0.1179) 0.0769 (0.0714)
553A Traditional style restaurants -0.8844*** (0.1963) -0.8128*** (0.1301) -0.8072*** (0.1646) -0.7193*** (0.1165)
555C Collective catering on contract basis -0.4964** (0.1819) -0.296*** (0.0785) -0.4052** (0.1298) -0.1986** (0.0895)
631D Refrigerated storage and warehousing -0.408** (0.1364) -0.5204*** (0.1078) -0.4738 (0.2593) -0.3923** (0.1796)
633Z Activities of travel agencies and tour operators -0.3732 (0.2202) -0.4932** (0.1548) -0.4787 (0.3994) -0.4167 (0.3130)
741G Business and management consultancy activities -2.8802*** (0.2653) -2.3639*** (0.2432) -4.8498*** (0.2156) -5.0473*** (0.3677)
748K Related services to production -1.5058*** (0.1512) -1.7771*** (0.1508) -2.9374*** (0.1247) -2.0213*** (0.1920)
900G Sanitation, remediation and similar activities -0.144 (0.1125) -0.2912** (0.0799) -0.7629*** (0.0336) -0.2052 (0.1154)
Panel C
143Z Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals 0.1258 (0.0979) 0.1313** (0.0681) 0.329 (0.2403) -0.0478 (0.0935)
151F Cooked meats production and trade 0.22*** (0.0764) -0.0787 (0.0562) 0.0467 (0.0661) 0.004 (0.0641)
152Z Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 0.242** (0.1342) -0.0409 (0.0951) -0.1257 (0.1310) -0.0761 (0.1352)
157C Manufacture of prepared pet foods 0.0389 (0.0907) 0.1064** (0.0548) -0.3305*** (0.0798) -0.1236 (0.0806)
202Z Manufacture of veneer sheets, plywood, laminboard, and other panels and
boards
0.6224** (0.1862) 0.2908 (0.2051) 0.5575** (0.2670) 0.1015 (0.2067)
241A Manufacture of industrial gases 1.9225*** (0.1857) 0.115 (0.0904) -0.1902 (0.1573) 1.542*** (0.1373)
244A Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products -0.1494 (0.1453) 0.2146** (0.0864) 0.6171*** (0.1769) -0.1511 (0.1187)
287C Manufacture of light metal packaging -0.1113 (0.0764) 0.1103** (0.0586) -0.2248** (0.0831) -0.4511*** (0.0791)
361M Manufacture of mattresses 0.5525** (0.1925) 0.1852 (0.1653) 0.4356** (0.2012) 0.3459** (0.1623)
365Z Manufacture of games and toys 0.5282*** (0.1206) -0.1344 (0.1266) 0.0669 (0.1580) -0.1034 (0.1055)
515C Wholesale of metals and metal ores 0.1712** (0.0754) 0.0838 (0.0598) 0.0112 (0.0932) 0.2622*** (0.0631)
518G Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software 0.2305** (0.0948) 0.08 (0.0740) 0.3952*** (0.1146) 0.2939*** (0.0840)
602B Road scheduled passenger land transport 0.3344** (0.1505) -0.2067 (0.15) -0.1365 (0.2971) 0.0184 (0.2183)
631E Non refrigerated storage and warehousing 0.3621** (0.1351) 0.0562 (0.1106) 0.6717** (0.2004) 0.3072 (0.1531)
711A Short term renting of automobiles 0.6906 (0.545) 0.727** (0.2702) -0.1302 (0.5357) 0.3021 (0.4980)
713C Renting of construction and civil engineering machinery and equipment 0.332 (0.413) 0.631*** (0.1898) 0.3129 (0.3595) 0.2874 (0.3235)
725Z Maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery 0.7115** (0.2189) -0.0148 (0.1543) 0.7034** (0.1743) 0.4174 (0.2911)
744B Advertising agency, advertising consultant 0.1095 (0.1662) 0.4813** (0.1624) 0.0836 (0.1412) 0.0727 (0.2475)
Note: Estimated coefficients of the triple interaction term (Top10×PostClosure×TreatedSector) from the regressions
on sales, employment, total assets and fixed assets (i.e., property plant and equipment). The included sectors are those
for which the coefficient is: (i) not significant in both the sales and employment regression (panel A); (ii) negative or
not significant in the sales and the employment regression (panel B); (iii) negative or not significant in either the sale
or the employment regression (panel C). All outcome variables in logs. One star denotes significance at the 5% level,
two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the 4-digit sector level.
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158H Manufacture of sugar 1 1689.5 2008
159S Production of mineral water 1 4339.75 2004
159T Production of soft drinks 1 620 2004
221E Publishing of journals and periodicals 1 578.5 2004
241E Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals 1 915.7 2006
292D Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment 1 847.5 2004
295G Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production 1 830.75 2005
314Z Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 1 1244.5 2005
452B Construction of sundry buildings 1 513.25 2007
513W Non specialized wholesale of food 2 2471.9 2004
514N Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 3 999.1 2007
518L Wholesale of electric equipment 5 1103.2 2006
526B Specialized retail sale via mail order 1 767 2007
526H Vending machine sale 1 1065.25 2005
631B Non harbour cargo handling 1 713.25 2008
743B Technical analyses, testing and inspections 1 1063.5 2005
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B Appendix –For Online Publication
B.1 Effect of closures on excess probabilities
Here we study how our main measure of ILM activity – the excess probability of hiring a worker if
she was originally employed in the same group – responds to firm closures and mass layoffs occurring
within the group, and ask whether such response varies across different occupations.
We denote as closures all episodes in which firms/plants experience a drop in employment from
one year to the next of 90% of more during our sample period, 2002-2010. In order to eliminate
false closures, i.e. situations in which firms/plants simply change identifies relabeling a continuing
activity, we remove all the cases in which more than 70% of the lost employment ends up in a single
other firm. See Section 5 for further details.
In Table B1, columns (1)-(8), the dependent variable is the estimated γ̂j,t averaged at the firm
level. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) show that ILM activity increases in the year following the closure
of at least one firm/plant in the group.48 Our results also show that closure is partially anticipated:
the ILM activity also increases the year before closure, though to a smaller extent: column (3), (4),
(7) and (8) show that in year t a firm has a more pronounced tendency to hire workers who in t− 1
were employed by its group affiliates, when at least one group firm/plant closes down in year t (and
thus in year t− 1 was one year away from closure). In column (9) the dependent variable is instead
our alternative measure of ILM activity based on outflows of workers from group-affiliated firms
(γ̂Oj,t). We find that the excess probability to originate from an affiliated firm for a worker who finds
a job in that firm’s group (as opposed to a worker who finds a job outside that group) increases by
8.6 percentage points at the time when her/his firm of origin closes down.
In Table B2 we turn to the excess probability γ̂c,j,t estimated at the triplet level {o, z, j} for
each year t as a dependent variable. We investigate whether the internal labor market for managers
and other high-skilled employees reacts differently to firm and plant closures occurring within the
group, with respect to the ILM for other occupational categories. Interestingly, closures spur ILM
activity for lower-ranked categories – mostly for Clerical Support workers and Blue Collars – but
reduce ILM intensity for the Managerial/High-Skilled labor force (column 4). This may be because
managers and other high-skilled employees have better outside options on the external labor market,
while low-skill employees have worse outside options available; furthermore, groups may be more
keen to redeploy internally workers belonging to more unionized occupational categories to avoid
union-driven conflicts generated by large layoffs of low-skilled workers after a closure. Finally, we
also observe that plant and firm closures within a group have a stronger positive effect on horizontal
ILM activity (column 5), particularly so in the case of lower-skilled occupations (column 6).
In sum, we observe that a plant or a firm closure “activates” the internal labor market. This
further confirms that groups rely on the ILM to coordinate the employment response of affiliated
firms to shocks calling for large layoffs, thus saving firing costs and providing employment insurance
to workers.
48More precisely, since “year of closure” denotes the last year of activity of the firm/plant before it loses at least
90% of its workforce, our results show that in year t a firm has a more pronounced tendency to hire workers who in
year t − 1 were employed by its group affiliates when at least one firm/plant in the group closes down (i.e. is in its
last year of activity) in year t− 1.
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Table B1. Effect of firm/plant closures in the group on ILM activity
Inflows Inflows Inflows Inflows Inflows Inflows Inflows Inflows Outflows
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Log) firm size 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) rest of the group size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
(Log) number of affiliated firms -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.081***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.005
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
Foreign Control -0.034 -0.036 -0.040 -0.040 -0.041 -0.038 -0.043 -0.040 -0.001
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.050)
Firm closure in rest of the group (in t-1) 0.017***
(0.001)
Between 1 and 5 0.017***
(0.001)
More than 5 0.026***
(0.003)
Firm closure (in t) 0.009***
(0.001)
Between 1 and 5 0.008***
(0.001)
More than 5 0.012***
(0.003)
Plant closure (in t-1) 0.015***
(0.001)
Between 1 and 5 0.015***
(0.001)
More than 5 0.020***
(0.002)
Plant closure (in t) 0.007***
(0.001)
Between 1 and 5 0.006***
(0.001)




N 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 289,689 279,433
Firm × Group and year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable in columns (1)-(8): Excess probability for firm j to hire a worker if she originates from
the same group as compared to a worker not originating from the same group as j. Dependent variable in column
(9): Excess probability of originating from affiliated firm j for workers landing into the same group as compared to
workers landing outside the group. Firm size is measured by (full time equivalent) total employment; Rest of the
group size is measured by the (full time equivalent) total employment of all the other firms that are affiliated with
the same group as firm j. We denote as firm/plant closure a situation in which a firm/plant sees its employment drop
by more than 90% from one year to the other. We consider as year of the closure the last year of activity of a given
firm/plant, before it loses at least 90% of its workforce. We do not consider as closures all the cases in which more
than 70% of the lost employment ends up in the same firm/plant. Firm closure in the rest of the group (in year t-1)
is an indicator equal to 1 if in year t − 1 at least one firm in the rest of the group closes, i.e. it undertakes its last
year of activity in yeat t− 1. Firm closure (year t) is an indicator equal to 1 if al least one firm in the group closes in
year t. Similarly for plant closure. Own closure is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j closes in year t. Standard errors
are clustered at the group level. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1%
level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table B2. Effect of firm/plant closures in the group on ILM activity by occupation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Log) Firm Size 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) Rest of the group size -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Log) Number of affiliated firms -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.011** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign Control -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Occupation of destination (Managers/High-Skill excluded)
Intermediate Occupation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Clerical Support -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.022*** -0.005*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Blue Collar -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.022*** -0.004*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupation of origin (Managers/High-Skill excluded)
Intermediate Occupation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Clerical Support -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Blue Collar -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Same Occupation -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
At least one closure in the group (in t-1) 0.005*** -0.008*** 0.002*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
At least one closure × Int. Occ. (dest.) 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)
At least one closure × Clerical (dest.) 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001)
At least one closure × Blue Coll.(dest.) 0.021*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
At least one closure (in t-1) × Same Occ. 0.012 *** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Same occupation × Int. Occ. -0.003***
(0.001)
Same occupation × Clerical -0.007***
(0.001)
Same occupation × Blue Coll. -0.016***
(0.001)
Same occupation × Int. Occ. × Closure 0.004***
(0.001)
Same occupation × Clerical × Closure 0.009***
(0.001)
Same occupation × Blue Coll. × Closure 0.016***
(0.001)
N 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670 8,992,670
Firm × Group and year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: Excess probability for firm j to hire a worker transiting from occupation o to occupation
z if she originates from the same group as j. Firm size is measured by (full time equivalent) total employment; Rest
of the group size is measured by the (full time equivalent) total employment of all the other firms that are affiliated
with the same group as firm j. State Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is state-owned.
Foreign Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is foreign. The occupational categories are the ones
indicated in Table A1. The category Managers/High-Skill groups category 2 and 3. Same Occupation is an indicator
equal to 1 if the (2-digit) occupation of origin is equal to the (2-digit) occupation of destination. We denote as firm
closure a situation in which a firm sees its employment drop by more than 90% from one year to the other. We
consider as year of the closure the last year of activity of a given firm, before it loses at least 90% of its workforce.
We do not consider as closures all the cases in which more than 70% of the lost employment ends up in the same
firm. Firm closure in the rest of the group (in year t-1) is a an indicator equal to 1 if in year t − 1 at least one firm
in the rest of the group closes, i.e. it undertakes its last year of activity in yeat t − 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the group level. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and
three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level.
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B.2 Internal labor markets at work: outflows
In the paper, we show that group-affiliated firms are more likely to hire workers already employed
in their own group rather than workers employed outside the group. We now measure the ILM
activity by asking a different – albeit related – question: are workers who find a job in a group more
likely - as compared to workers who find a job outside that group - to originate from an affiliated
firm? To answer this question, we estimate the excess probability that a worker (transiting between
two occupations) originates from firm j if she lands to an affiliated firm, over the probability that
the worker originates from firm j while landing to a non-affiliated firm.
As earlier, we denote as c the set of workers in occupation o at t−1 who move to occupation z in
any firm at time t. We model the probability that worker i moving from occupation o to occupation










where EOi,c,j,t takes value one if worker i moving from occupation o to occupation z separates from
firm j at time t and zero otherwise. BGOi,j,t takes value one if worker i’s firm of destination belongs
to the same group as the firm of origin j at time t and zero otherwise.
The term βOc,j,t is a firm-occupation pair specific effect that captures the time-varying natural
tendency of workers moving from occupation o to occupation z to originate from firm j. This may
be high due to the fact that carrying out occupation o in firm j endows a worker with the skills that
facilitate moving to occupation z in any other firm. Our parameter of interest is γOc,j,t, that measures
the excess probability of a worker moving from o to z to originate from firm j if she lands at time
t to a firm affiliated with the same group as j, over the probability to originate from firm j if the
worker lands to a firm not affiliated with j’s group. The error term εOi,j,t captures all other factors
that affect the probability that worker i moving from occupation o to occupation z originates from
firm j.
















as the fraction of workers that originate from firm j among all workers moving from occupation
o to z whose firm of destination belongs to the same group as firm j. As discussed earlier, this
fraction may be high because workers performing occupation o in firm j have a high propensity to
move to occupation z in other firms, and the group includes firms intensive in occupation z. Hence,
the observation of many transitions from occupation o in firm j to occupation z within the group
cannot necessarily be ascribed to the ILM activity.
We then compute the fraction of workers that originate from firm j among all workers moving











= βOc,j,t + u˜
−BG,O
c,j,t (14)











We estimate the parameter γOc,j,t for each occupation pair-firm as the difference between two prob-
abilities: that of originating from firm j for workers (transiting between two occupations o and z)
who land to an affiliated firm, and that of originating from firm j for workers (transiting between
two occupations o and z) who land to a non-affiliated firm. As in the previous case, the sample
analog of the γOc,j,t’s estimated in equation (15) is the OLS estimate of equation (12).
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Table B3. Mean excess probability of originating from a group-affiliated firm for workers landing into the same group as compared to workers
landing outside the group
Panel A: Job transitions between any two occupations Panel B: Job transitions within same occupation
Percentiles Percentiles
Year Mean St.Dev. 10 25 50 75 90 N Mean St.Dev. 10 25 50 75 90 N
Unweighted firm-level aggregation Unweighted firm-level aggregation
2002 0.090 0.232 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.333 36555 0.066 0.201 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.185 34140
2003 0.095 0.240 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.344 35343 0.071 0.211 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.236 32966
2004 0.098 0.243 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.378 36707 0.072 0.213 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.248 34139
2005 0.095 0.239 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.355 40517 0.071 0.210 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.233 37950
2006 0.090 0.234 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.333 42203 0.067 0.204 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.205 39441
2007 0.087 0.228 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.333 45709 0.659 0.202 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.197 43033
2008 0.095 0.242 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.347 40695 0.073 0.216 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.250 38265
2009 0.100 0.248 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.407 39549 0.075 0.217 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.250 37070
Weighted firm-level aggregation Weighted firm-level aggregation
2002 0.083 0.226 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.258 36555 0.061 0.197 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.143 34110
2003 0.088 0.235 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.333 35343 0.066 0.206 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.166 32966
2004 0.091 0.237 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.333 36707 0.067 0.208 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.166 34139
2005 0.088 0.233 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.332 40517 0.066 0.204 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.166 37950
2006 0.084 0.228 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.266 42203 0.063 0.198 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.158 39441
2007 0.080 0.222 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.250 45709 0.061 0.197 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.143 43033
2008 0.089 0.237 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.333 40695 0.069 0.211 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.181 38265
2009 0.093 0.243 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.333 39549 0.070 0.212 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.197 37070
Note: The left hand side (Panel A) considers job-to-job transitions between any two occupations, where we restrict the set c to all transitions occurring between occupation o
and occupation z that land to the same departments in France where firm j’s group is active. In the right-hand side (Panel B), we further restrict the set c to include only
transitions occurring between occupation o and occupation z in which occupation o is equal to occupation z. The first column indicates the year in which workers transiting
from one job to another left the affiliated firm j. The upper parts of panels A and B present simple averages. The bottom part of panel A shows weighted averages where the
weight associated to each γOc,j is the ratio of the number of transitions from occupation o to occupation z that land in firm j’s group to the total number of transitions (for
all the occupation pairs associated with firm j) that land in j’s group. The bottom part of panel B shows weighted averages where the weight associated to each γOc,j is the
ratio of the number of transitions from occupation o to occupation z, with o = z, that land in firm j’s group to the total number of transitions (for all the occupation pairs
associated with firm j) that land in j’s group.
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B.3 Results on outflows
All the regressions discussed in Section 4 are replicated using γOc,j,t as our measure of ILM activity.
Results are reported in the following tables.
Table B4. ILM activity and group sectoral diversification (Outflows)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log) Firm size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) Rest of the group size 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
(Log) Number of affiliated firms -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.086***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 0.009
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016)
Foreign control -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.012
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)
Diversification (Macrosectors) 0.015* 0.013
(0.007) (0.007)
Diversification × Rest of the group size 0.011***
(0.003)
Diversification (4 digit) 0.012* 0.030***
(0.006) (0.006)
Diversification (4d) × Rest of the 0.023***
group size (0.003)
N 279,433 279,433 279,433 279,433
Firm × Group and year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: Excess probability of originating from affiliated firm j for workers landing into the same
group as compared to workers landing outside the group. Firm size is measured by (full time equivalent) total
employment; Rest of the group size is measured by the (full time equivalent) total employment of all the other firms
that are affiliated to the same group as firm j. State Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is state-
owned. Foreign Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is foreign. Diversification (macrosectors)
is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of the employment shares of all firms affiliated with a group,
where each share is the ratio of the total employment of affiliated firms active in a given macrosectors over the
total employment of the group. Macrosectors are agriculture, service, finance, manifacturing, energy, automotive.
Diversification (4-digit) is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of the employment shares of all firms
affiliated with a group, where each share is the ratio of the total employment of affiliated firms active in a given 4-digit
sector to the total employment of the group. The variables Rest of the group size, Number of firms in the group,
Diversification are normalised to have zero mean. Standard errors are clustered at the group level. One star denotes
significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three stars denote significance at the
0.1% level.
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Table B5. ILM activity and group geographical diversification (Outflows)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Log) Firm size 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) Rest of the group size 0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
(Log) Number of affiliated firms -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.086***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.009
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Foreign control -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.008
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047)
Diversification (Paris Area) 0.029*** 0.016
(0.008) (0.008)
Diversification × Rest of the group size 0.024***
(0.004)
Diversification (Region) 0.035*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007)
Diversification (Reg.) × Rest of the 0.027***
group size (0.003)
N 279,433 279,433 279,433 279,433
Firm × Group and year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: Excess probability of originating from affiliated firm j for workers landing into the same
group as compared to workers landing outside the group. Firm size is measured by (full time equivalent) total
employment; Rest of the group size is measured by the (full time equivalent) total employment of all the other firms
that are affiliated to the same group as firm j. State Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is
state-owned. Foreign Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is foreign. Diversification (Paris
Area) is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of the employment shares of all firms affiliated with a
group, where each share is the ratio of the total employment of affiliated firms active in the Paris Area/outside the
Paris Area over the total employment of the group. Diversification (Region) is computed as the opposite of the sum
of the squares of the employment shares of all firms affiliated with a group, where each share is the ratio of the total
employment of affiliated firms active in a given region over the total employment of the group. The variables Rest of
the group size, Number of firms in the group, Diversification are normalised to have zero mean. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1%
level, and three stars denote significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table B6. Heterogeneity of ILM activity by occupation (Outflows)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Log) Firm Size 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Log) Rest of the group size -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Log) Number of affiliated firms -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
State Control -0.007 -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Foreign Control -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Occupation of destination (Managers/High-Skill excluded)
Intermediate Occupation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Clerical Support -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Blue Collar -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Occupation of origin (Managers/High-Skill excluded)
Intermediate Occupation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Clerical Support -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Blue Collar -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Same Occupation -0.003*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Same Occupation × Intermediate Occupation -0.002***
(0.000)
Same Occupation × Clerical Support -0.006***
(0.000)




Div × Intermediate Occupation (Origin) 0.018***
(0.002)
Div × Clerical Support (Origin) 0.032***
(0.003)




Div. × Intermediate occupation (Origin) 0.011***
(0.001)
Div. × Clerical Support (Origin) 0.022***
(0.003)




N 8,804,083 8,804,083 8,804,083 8,804,083 8,804,083 8,804,083
Firm × Group and year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variable: Excess probability of originating from affiliated firm j for workers transiting between
occupation o and occupation z landing into the same group as compared to workers landing outside the group. Firm
size is measured by (full time equivalent) total employment; Rest of the group size is measured by the (full time
equivalent) total employment of all the other firms that are affiliated to the same group as firm j. State Control is an
indicator equal to 1 if the head of the group is state-owned. Foreign Control is an indicator equal to 1 if the head of
the group is foreign. The occupational categories are the ones indicated in Table 1. The category Managers/High-Skill
groups category 2 and 3. Same Occupation is an indicator equal to 1 if the (2-digit) occupation of origin is equal to
the (2-digit) occupation of destination. Diversification (4-digit) is computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares
of the employment shares of all firms affiliated with a group, where each share is the ratio of the total employment
of affiliated firms active in a given 4-digit sector to the total employment of the group. Diversification (Region) is
computed as the opposite of the sum of the squares of the employment shares of all firms affiliated with a group, where
each share is the ratio of the total employment of affiliated firms active in a given region over the total employment
of the group. We denote as firm closure a situation in which a firm sees its employment drop by more than 90% from
one year to the other. We consider as year of the closure the last year of activity of a given firm, before it loses at least
90% of its workforce. We do not consider as closures all the cases in which more than 70% of the lost employment ends
up in the same firm. Own closure is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j closes in year t. Standard errors are clustered at
the group level. One star denotes significance at the 5% level, two stars denote significance at the 1% level, and three
stars denote significance at the 0.1% level.
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